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"Knock on Any Door"-Home




The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution guar-
antees every individual the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.' In the last two Terms, the Supreme Court
addressed an uncertain area of search and seizure law. First, in Pay-
ton v. New York,2 the Court considered whether the fourth amend-
ment requires police to obtain a warrant3 before making a forcible
entry into a house to arrest a suspect in the absence of exigent cir-
cumstances.4  Later, in Steagald v. United States,5 the Court ad-
dressed one question Payton left open: Does the fourth amendment
mandate that law enforcement officers obtain a search warrant
before entering the house of a third party to arrest a suspect?
The resolution of the warrantless entry question follows the
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.
2. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
3. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained as the fruit of an illegal search
of a defendant's home is inadmissible against the defendant in a criminal trial. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The fourth amendment does not require the exclusion of the body
of a person illegally arrested. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). An illegal arrest
may effect the defendant's subsequent conviction. Evidence found in plain view after an ile-
gal entry to arrest, or seized during a search incident to an unlawful arrest, or elicited by way
of a confession from the defendant after the illegal arrest, will be excluded as the fruit of a
fourth amendment violation. Therefore, fourth amendment strictures on entry into the home
to arrest a suspect can result in suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitu-
tional entry.
4. "Exigent circumstances" is a term of art that connotes either a need for police action
in response to an emergency, or the existence of a combination of circumstances calling for
immediate remedy. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 515 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
5. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
Supreme Court's reservation of the issue several times in the past
two decades.6 On other occasions, the Court tacitly approved war-
rantless entry upon private property to arrest by failing to address
that issue when deciding the validity of a contemporaneous search.7
While the Court had deftly avoided direct consideration of the con-
stitutional validity of warrantless entry into a home to arrest a sus-
pect absent exigent circumstances, subsequent events invited the
resolution of the question.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that,
whenever practicable, the reasonableness of a search should be de-
termined by a neutral detached magistrate, not by police officers en-
gaged in ferreting out crime.8 Without advance judicial approval
through the warrant procedure, a search is per se unreasonable, sub-
ject only to a few narrow and well delineated exceptions.' The
Supreme Court made clear, however, that arrests in public places are
treated differently. In such situations the Court approved police ac-
6. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (reasoning that the police had
commenced the arrest in public and that the exigent circumstances of hot pursuit justified their
subsequent warrantless entry to Santana's home); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432-
33 (1976) (expressly noting the question of warrantless entry into a home while deciding con-
stitutionality of warrantless arrest in public places); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
477-78 (1971) (warrantless police entry to arrest, absent exigent circumstances, was in "funda-
mental conflict" with fourth amendment law); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500
(1958) (holding that the officers' entry was clearly to search, the Court left unresolved the grave
constitutional question of a warrantless entry to arrest when there was adequate time to obtain
a warrant). Other cases have also raised, but not decided, the issue of warrantless entry into
the home to arrest without a warrant. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975)
(person arrested without a warrant held entitled to a timely judicial determination of probable
cause before significant pretrial restraint occurs); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365
(1972) (evidence tainted by illegality was not used against defendant at trial).
7. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court assumed the constitutionality
of an arrest warrant. Bypassing the issue of legality of entry to arrest, the Court rendered its
decision on what the Justices perceived to be a more pressing issue--that the full scale search
of a defendant's house, conducted after his arrest, went beyond the fourth amendment scope of
a search incident to arrest. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (negative implication
that a warrant is required prior to entry to arrest in absence of exigent circumstances). The
Court has failed to discuss the issue in other cases in which it was presented. See, e.g., Sabbath
v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) (evidence suppressed after an unannounced warrantless
entry because of failure to announce as required by state statute). See also cases cited in note
190 Mfra.
8. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which rea-
sonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those infer-
ences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14. See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965) ("The fact that
exceptions to the requirement that searches and seizures be undertaken only after obtaining a
warrant are limited underscores the preference accorded police action taken under a warrant
as against searches and seizures without one.").
9. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971) (plurality opinion); see G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
439 (1973); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16, 318 (1972);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
tion based merely on probable cause without the necessity of a war-
rant. 10 Lower courts' application of these two well established
search and seizure doctrines resulted in a bifurcated standard to
measure the constitutionality of a search of a home and an arrest in a
home. The standard generated confusion and uncertainty because
the warrant procedure accorded greater protection to an individual's
possessions than to his person.
Uncertainties climaxed when a state court and a federal court
both faced the issue and reached directly opposite results on fourth
amendment grounds. In April 1978, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that, absent exigent circumstances,
the fourth amendment requires a warrant prior to entry into the
home to arrest." Three months later, the New York Court of Ap-
peals reached the opposite result on virtually identical facts. 2 Con-
sequently, federal courts in New York would suppress evidence
seized as a result of warrantless entry to arrest, but state courts in
New York would admit the evidence.' 3 Moreover, the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals were seriously divided on the issue. 4 In-
10. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976). It is also well settled that objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public
place may be seized without a warrant. The distinction between a warrantless seizure in an
open area and a seizure on private premises was succinctly stated in G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open area or seizable
by levy without an intrusion into privacy, and it is quite another thing to effect a
warrantless seizure of property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private
premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer.
Id. at 354.
11. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
12. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978).
13. The federal and state court conflict is particularly significant in light of Stonev. Pow-
ell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), in which the Court held that the petitioner in fourth amendment cases
cannot invoke habeas corpus review if he has been afforded an opportunity for "full and fair
litigation" of his constitutional claim within the state courts. Id. at 482. Thus, New York state
court defendants do not have access to collateral review.
14. Cases from the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits, either
by holding or dictum, support the proposition that, absent exigent circumstances, the fourth
amendment requires a warrant for police entry to arrest in the home. See United States v.
House, 603 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calhoun, 542
F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); Accarino v. United States,
179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The Accanrno decision was reaffirmed in Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which guidelines were formulated for determining
when exigent circumstances exist. Several courts have adopted these guidelines, thus implic-
itly accepting the proposition that in absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant would have
been required. See Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
Three circuits have upheld the constitutionality of warrantless home arrests. See United
States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1978) (possible exigent circumstances); United
States v. Burnett, 526 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rei. Wright v. Woods, 432 F.2d
1143 (7th Cir. 1970); Michael v. United States, 393 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1968).
Substantial conflict on the issue of warrantless entry to the home to arrest exists in state
courts. See, eg., State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d 877 (1977); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.
3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); People v. Moreno,
176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971); People v. Sanders, 56 IMI. App. 3d 6, 374 N.E.2d 1315
discriminate use of the exigent circumstances doctrine created addi-
tional confusion and indicated the need for authoritative resolution
of the issue.
Similarly, it was unclear whether law enforcement officers pos-
sessed authority to enter the house of a third party to arrest a suspect
in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent. Courts consist-
ently required a warrant to authorize entry to a third party house,
but failed to agree on the form of the warrant. Some courts did not
explicitly demand a search warrant, but nevertheless stated that an
office.r executing an arrest warrant on third party premises must have
probable cause to believe the suspect is within and must be con-
fronted with exigent circumstances.' 5 A search warrant, therefore,
was implicitly needed in the absence of an emergency. 16 Noting the
tenuous relationship between the third party and the crime allegedly
committed by the suspect, these courts focused on the expectation of
privacy'7 of the presumably innocent third party. A majority of
courts, however, found that the existence of an arrest warrant plus
probable cause to believe the suspect was on the premises justified
entry into the residence of a third party.'I In 1979, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 19 explicitly rejected the need
for a search warrant prior to entry into a third party home in the
absence of exigent circumstances. This provided the Supreme Court
with a vehicle to resolve a lingering issue of search and seizure law.
(1978); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978) (each requiring a warrant prior to entry to arrest
absent exigent circumstances). But see People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d
686 (1970); State v. Perez, 277 So. 2d 778 (Fla.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); White v.
State, 210 Tenn. 78, 356 S.W.2d 411 (1962); State v. Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253
(1977) (each permitting warrantless entry to the home to arrest in absence of exigent
circumstances).
15. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Fisher v. Volz, 496
F.2d 333, 338-39, 341-42, 343 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Williams, 385 F. Supp. 1400,
1404 (E.D. Mich. 1974); See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1979); State
v. Spraggin, 71 Wis. 2d 604, 611-12, 239 N.W.2d 297, 304 (1979).
16. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (W.D.N.C. 1971);
United States v. Williams, 385 F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See United States v.
Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
17. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. See United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972). ("The arrest warrant
issued under Rule 4(c) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] provides authority to
enter any premises for the purpose of enforcing the warrant, if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect is located therein"); United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 983 (2d
Cir. 1980); State v. Jordan, 605 P.2d 646, 650, 651 (Or. 1980); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980) (the same dual mandate requirement); United States v. Gaultney,
606 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1979), on rehearing, 615 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1980, reversed and
remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981); United States v. Hammond, 585 F.2d 26, 28 n.l (2d Cir.
1978) (dictum) (defendant did not challenge legality of arrest); United States v. Cravero, 545
F.2d 406 (5th Cir.), on reconsideration, 545 F.2d 420, 421 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959
(1976); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1292 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. McKinney, 379
F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967).
19. United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979), on rehearing 615 F.2d 642
(5th Cir. 1980), reversed and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
The Supreme Court debate on the constraints on police entry
into the home reflects the fundamental policies of the fourth amend-
ment. The fourth amendment seeks to protect two kinds of inter-
ests-a liberty interest in being free from personal seizure and a
privacy interest in controlling government access to information
about oneself2° through the nonconsensual entry into the home2 to
examine papers and other effects.22 Concurrently, the fourth amend-
ment seeks to protect the government's legitimate interest in effective
law enforcement.23 Thus, courts must balance society's interest in
effective law enforcement and the individual's interest in the privacy
of the home. Equilibrium is essential if the fourth amendment is to
remain an "instrument by which a free society imposes on itself the
seldom welcome .. .almost indispensable restraints that keep it
free."'24
This article first discusses the facts, holding, and rationale of the
Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New York,25 which addressed
the need for a warrant to enter a home to arrest a suspect in the
absence of exigent circumstances. Similar treatment is accorded the
Court's decision in Steagald v. United States,26 which answered
whether a search warrant is necessary to enter a third party home to
effectuate an arrest. Next, the article identifies and analyzes several
unresolved issues: the meaning of the terms "home" and "dwelling"
as used in Payton; the significance of the requirement in Payton that
officers have probable cause to believe that the suspect is on the
premises when the arrest warrant is executed; and the practical im-
pact of Payton on the Supreme Court decision permitting warrant-
less public arrests.27 Two major remaining areas of uncertainty also
are analyzed: First, the definition of exigent circumstances and the
standard by which the existence of such circumstances are measured;
20. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy" 4 Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 978 (1968). Both interests are protected by the fourth
amendment, which addresses the right of the people to be secure against searches of their
houses, papers, and effects, as well as their right to be secure against personal seizure. See
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 358 (1974). It is
now well established that the fourth amendment is concerned with protection of both individ-
ual liberty and individual privacy. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (probable
cause needed to effect a public arrest). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967)
("the Fourth Amendment. . . protects individual privacy ... but its protections go further,
and often have nothing to do with privacy.").
21. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
22. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
23. The fourth amendment attempts to protect innocent suspects against unjustified ar-
rests and searches. It does not seek to inhibit aggressive investigation of criminal activity when
probable cause exists. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431-32 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring). See also id at 417-18 (White, J.).
24. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 353
(1974).
25. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
26. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
27. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
and second, the requisite standing to raise the substantive claim of a
fourth amendment violation.
II. Payton v. New York: Facts, Holding, Rationale
On January 14, 1970, after two days of intensive investigation,
New York detectives assembled sufficient evidence to establish prob-
able cause to believe Theodore Payton murdered the manager of a
gas station. The next day, six officers went to Payton's apartment to
arrest him without a warrant. Although music and light emanated
from the apartment, no one responded to a knock on the door.28 Of-
ficers from the Emergency Service Department were summoned and
they opened the door forcibly with crowbars. The police entered,
searched for but did not find the defendant, and observed in plain
view a thirty caliber shell casing that was seized and later admitted
into evidence at Payton's murder trial.29 Payton surrendered to the
police and was ultimately convicted of the felony murder.30
In the companion case, Obie Riddick was arrested on March 14,
1974, for the commission of two armed robberies that occurred in
1971. No arrest warrant was procured. A detective accompanied by
three other officers knocked on Riddick's door and Riddick's son
opened it. The officers entered the house, viewed Riddick sitting in
bed covered by a sheet, and placed Riddick under arrest. Detectives
searched three areas--the bed, a chest of drawers two feet from the
bed, and the defendant's clothing.3 I Narcotics and related parapher-
nalia were found in the chest of drawers. Riddick was subsequently
28. 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
29. A thorough search of the apartment resulted in the seizure of additional evidence
tending to prove Payton's guilt, but the prosecutor stipulated that the officers' warrantless
search of the apartment was illegal and that all the seized evidence except the shell casing
should be suppressed. Id
30. At trial, Payton moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. The trial
judge held that evidence in plain view was properly seized and the warrantless and forcible
entry was authorized by the New York Code of Criminal Procedure.
At the time in question, January 15, 1970, the law applicable to the police conduct
related above was governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure as applicable to the case recited: 'A peace officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person. . . 3. When a felony has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have commit-
ted it.' Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided: 'To make an arrest
as provided in the last section [177] the officer may break open an outer or inner door
or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose he be refused
admittance.'
People v. Payton, 84 Misc. 2d 973, 974-75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, N.Y. 1974). The judge
found that exigent circumstances, e.g., reason to believe that an unreasonable physical risk to
police or to innocent persons existed, or reason to believe that an escape may be effected, could
justify the failure to announce purpose before entering the apartment per statutory require-
ment. The judge further concluded the statute supported warrantless entry regardless of the
circumstances. Id at 975. The Appellate Division summarily affirmed. People v. Payton, 55
A.D.2d 859 (1976).
31. 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 228, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
convicted of narcotics charges.32
The New York Court of Appeals, in a single opinion, affirmed
the convictions of Payton and Riddick 33 and rejected the claim that
the introduction or availability of evidence that was crucial to de-
fendants' convictions should have been suppressed because of un-
lawful procurement. A four judge majority emphasized the
substantial difference between intrusions that attend an entry to
search the premises and intrusions that result from an entry to arrest.
In an entry to search, the infringement on privacy is greater because
of the intrusion into the person's possessions and affairs.3 4 Since per-
sonal seizure in a public place did not require a warrant, 35 the court
refused to distinguish a personal seizure in a residence. They rea-
soned that a minimum invasion of privacy resulted from entry on the
premises to arrest as compared with the gross intrusion that accom-
panied the arrest itself.36 Support for the rationale was found in the
acceptance of warrantless entries to make felony arrests both in Eng-
lish common law and in American practice.
37
Three members of the New York Court of Appeals filed dissents
32. At a suppression hearing, the trial judge held that the warrantless entry into the home
was authorized by the revised New York statute. New York Criminal Procedure Law
§ 140.15(4) provided with respect to arrest without a warrant:
In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter premises in which he
reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same circumstances and in
the same manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of subdivisions four and
five of section 120.80, if he were attempting to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant
of arrest.
Section 120.80, governing execution of arrest warrants, provides in relevant part:
4. In order to effect the arrest, the police officer or peace officer appointed by
the state university may, under the circumstances and in a manner prescribed in this
subdivision, enter any premises in which he reasonably believes the defendants to be
present. Before such entry, he must give, or make reasonable effort to give, notice ofhi authority and purpose to an occupant thereof, unless there is reasonable cause to
believe that the giving of such notice will:
(a) Result in the defendant escaping or attempting to escape; or
(b) Endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person; or
(c) Result in the destruction, damaging or secretion of material evidence.
5. If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his
authority and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may enter
such premises, and by a breaking if necessary.
N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 120.80 (McKinney's Supp. 1980). The court found the arrest was
lawful because it was based on probable cause, and that the search incident to arrest did not
exceed the limits set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Appellate Divi-
sion affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. People v. Riddick, 56 A.D.2d 937 (1977).
33. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 330, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978).
34. Id at 309-10, 380 N.E.2d at 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399-400.
35. Id, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411 (1976)).
36. To the extent that an arrest will always be distasteful or offensive, there is little
reason to assume that arrest within the home is any more so than arrest in a public
place; on the contrary, it may well be that because of the added exposure the latter
may be more objectionable.
45 N.Y.2d at 310-11, 380 N.E.2d at 228, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
37. The court stated that
the apparent historical acceptance in the English common law of warrantless entries
to make felony arrests. . . and the existence of statutory authority for such entries in
this State since the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881 argue
in the case.38 All three concluded that the Constitution required po-
lice to obtain a warrant prior to entry to arrest a person in the ab-
sence of exigent circumstances. The judges reasoned that the
distinction between arrest and search was tenuous at best because an
entry to arrest was simply a search for a person rather than things.
Thus, the constitutional guarantees that assured the privacy and se-
curity of the home applied with equal force to entry to arrest. While
the dissenters admitted the existence of statutes, common law codifi-
cations, and statutory authority in New York for almost one hun-
dred years, they concluded that "neither antiquity nor legislative
unanimity can be determinative of the grave constitutional question
presented" and "can never be a substitute for reasoned analysis."39
On appeal of the New York court's decision, the Supreme Court
held in Payton v. New York' that the fourth amendment made ap-
plicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment prohibits police,
in the absence of exigent circumstances, from making a warrantless
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effectuate a rou-
tine felony arrest.
The majority opinion,4' written by Justice Stevens, began by
stating what was not at issue in the case. Neither arrest involved
exigent circumstances or warrantless entry into the third person's
home. In neither case did the police lack probable cause to believe
the suspect was at home when they entered. Finally, in both cases
the entry was made without the consent of an occupant.
The majority next focused on the language of the fourth amend-
ment.42 Statements from earlier Court opinions viewed arrest as a
species of seizure required by the fourth amendment to be reason-
against a holding of unconstitutionality and substantiate the reasonableness of such
procedure ....
Id at 311-12, 380 N.E.2d at 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400-01.
38. Judges Wachtler and Fuchsberg agreed with the reasoning of Judge Cooke's dissent-
ing opinion. One dissenting judge found that exigent circumstances existed and would have
justified the warrantless arrest of Payton. Nevertheless, he voted to reverse the conviction on
the ground that some testimony and records had been improperly admitted into evidence
under the inevitable discovery doctrine. (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Id at 315, 380 N.E.2d at
232, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
39. 45 N.Y.2d at 324, 380 N.E.2d at 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 409. The dissenters further
noted that an onerous burden would not be placed upon police by requiring them to obtain
prior judicial approval for a nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances. A judicial officer, not a policeman, determines when a right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of a search.
40. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
41. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan, Stew-
art, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion.
Justice White fied a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined. Justice Rehnquist also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
42. See note I supra The two separate clauses make it "perfectly clear that the evil the
Amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant." 445
U.S. at 585.
able.43 Therefore, the language of the amendment was to be equally
applied to seizures of persons and to seizures of property.
The majority determined that the applicable principles were es-
tablished in cases addressing the seizure of tangible physical objects.
The fundamental principle was fourth amendment protection
against unauthorized entry into the home. Since the general rule
was that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home were pre-
sumptively unreasonable, the decision whether to enter a home was
to be made by a judicial officer and not delegated to law enforce-
ment officials.' A distinction between entries to arrest and entries to
search, as advanced by the New York Court of Appeals, was
nonexistent.4 5
Although the majority recognized that the fourth amendment
protects the individual and his privacy in a variety of settings, it
noted that in none of those settings was an individual's zone of pri-
vacy as clearly defined as in "the unambiguous physical dimensions
of an individual's home."'  The fourth amendment "[i]n terms that
apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, ...
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." '4 7 Absent exigent
circumstances, the crossing of that threshold required a warrant.
Furthermore, the factors relied on in United States v. Watson
48
to allow police to arrest a suspect on probable cause in a public place
without either a warrant or exigent circumstances were absent in
Payton. First, the common law failed to provide the guidance that it
had provided in Watson. After an extensive review of the English
authorities, the Court concluded that although the common law rule
on arrests in the home was far from clear, the sources displayed a
sensitivity to privacy interests in the home.4 9 Second, although a
majority of state courts had upheld the constitutionality of warrant-
less, nonexigent home arrest, the trend was toward the opposite di-
43. The Court noted
Almost a century ago the Court stated in resounding terms that the principles re-
flected in the Amendment 'reached further than the concrete form' of the specific
cases that gave it birth, and 'apply to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' Without
pausing to consider whether that broad language may require some qualification, it is
sufficient to note that the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required
by the Amendment to be reasonable. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Powell noted m his
concurrence in United States v. Watson... the arrest of a person is 'quintessentially
a seizure.'
445 U.S. at 585 (citations omitted).
44. Id at 589.
45. "[A]ny differences in the intrusiveness ...are merely ones of degree rather than
kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance to
an individual's home." Id.
46. Id
47. Id
48. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
49. 445 U.S. at 590-98.
rection.5 ° Finally, unlike Watson, no federal statutes were cited by
the state to support the argument of congressional authority to effect
warrantless entries.5'
Additionally, no law enforcement policy reasons obviated the
need for the warrant requirement. Justice Stevens noted that policy
arguments must yield to an unequivocal constitutional command.
5 2
In the Court's view, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause
implicitly carries limited authority to enter a suspect's dwelling if no
reason exists to believe the suspect is inside.
53
In a brief concurring opinion,54 Justice Blackmun presented
reasons for agreeing with the majority both in the instant case and in
Watson. Balancing the competing government and individual inter-
ests required a different result when the sanctity of the home was in
issue. In dissent, Justice White asserted that the common law and
the history of the fourth amendment clearly led to a different re-
sult.55 Furthermore, cases that questioned the reasonableness of
warrantless nonexigent entry to arrest were distinguishable because
they referred to the special problems of nighttime entries. 56  Al-
though the Court purported to find no guidance in the relevant fed-
eral statutes, the dissenters believed that the statutes authorized the
type of police conduct at issue in these cases.57
50. Id at 599. The Court observed that although the weight of state authority was clear,
unanimity existed on this question, contrary to the situation in United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976). The Court noted that only twenty-four of the fifty states were currently sanc-
tioning warrantless entries to arrest and that an obvious declining trend was apparent. Fur-
ther, the strength of the trend was greater than the numbers indicated. Seven state courts
recently had held that warrantless arrests violated their respective state constitutions. By in-
voking their state constitutional provisions, the state courts' immunized their decisions from
review by the United States Supreme Court.
51. Id
52. Id at 602.
53. Id
54. Id at 603.
55. "Because it was not considered generally unreasonable at common law for officers to
break doors to effect a warrantless felony arrest, I do not believe the fourth amendment was
intended to outlaw the types of police conduct at issue in the present case." Id at 611. In
dicta, Justice White often has expressed the view that warrantless entry to the home to arrest,
even in the absence of exigent circumstances does not violate the fourth amendment's proscrip-
tion against unreasonable arrest. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43-44 (1976)
(White, J., concurring); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6 (1976); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 523 (1971) (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 778-83 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
56. 445 U.S. at 613. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court
stated,
[I]f.. .[it] is correct that it has generally been assumed that the Fourth Amendment
is not violated by the warrantless entry of a man's house for purposes of arrest, it
might be wise to re-examine the assumption. Such a re-examination would 'confront
us with a grave constitutional question, namely, whether the forcible nighttime entry
into a dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed within, upon probable cause
that he had committed a felony, under circumstances where no reason appears why
an arrest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
Id at 480 (citations omitted).
57. Id at 614. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1976), certain federal agents may "make arrest
The dissenters interpreted the fourth amendment as granting no
"talismanic significance to the fact that an arrest occurs in the home
rather than elsewhere." ' Inquiry was to focus on the actual extent
of invasion of constitutionally protected privacy. Arguing that ar-
rests in a home are sufficiently restricted by felony, knock and an-
nounce, daytime, and stringent probable cause requirements,59 the
dissenters criticized the majority for devising a new "hard and fast
rule."60 Front door arrests, the minority argued, are no more intru-
sive than public warrantless arrests. The incremental intrusiveness
resulting from an arrest executed in the dwelling was insufficient to
support an inflexible constitutional rule that required a warrant
whenever exigent circumstances were not present.6 Finally, the dis-
senters claimed that effective law enforcement would clearly be
hampered.62
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist first chas-
tised the majority for using the word "routine" to describe the arrests
in this case, and then mounted an attack on the continuing vitality of
the exclusionary rule.63
The division within the Court illustrates that resolution of the
constitutionality of warrantless home arrests invokes an analysis of
the policies of the fourth amendment as revealed in its common law
heritage, its language, prior interpretation by the Court, and the con-
sensus of state decisions and statutory pronouncements. Ultimately,
the outcome necessitates the delicate constitutional balancing of per-
sonal privacy and governmental interests.
A. Common Law and Language of the Fourth Amendment
In assessing the constitutionality of warrantless public arrests
and searches, the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that its
conclusions are consistent with the common law.64 This consistency
without warrants for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for
any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to
believe the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony." The dissenters
specifically cite this statute as providing authorization for federal agents to make warrantless
arrests anywhere, including the home. See also id at § 3109 (explicitly providing authority to
enter when executing a search warrant).
58. 445 U.S. at 615.
59. Id at 616.
60. Id at 603.
61. The dissenters argued that a rule permitting warrantless arrest entries would not pose
a danger that entry power would serve as a pretext to conduct an invalid warrantless search.
Id at 618.
62. Id at 618-20. The dissenters expressed the following concerns: (1) Will police have
to make subtle discriminations, even after probable cause is established, that enough evidence
to convict is present? (2) Are circumstances sufficiently exigent to justify entry without an
arrest warrant?
63. Id at 620-21.
64. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-23 (1976). See also United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1977). No independent legislative history of the fourth amendment
reflects the Court's opinion that common law rules mirror what the
authors of the fourth amendment viewed as restraints on govern-
mental searches and seizures. Although the authorities are not in
agreement,65 most writers assert that the common law of arrest sanc-
tioned the police practice of breaking doors without a warrant to
arrest a person suspected of committing a felony.6 6
Despite uncertainty whether the framers of the fourth amend-
ment intended to change the common law of warrantless arrests, au-
thorities agree that the second clause of the fourth amendment was
intended to eliminate the abuses inherent in the general warrant pro-
cedure then prevalent in the colonies. It has been argued, however,
that the fourth amendment in its entirety was intended only to pro-
hibit searches and seizures made pursuant to a general warrant.67
Most commentators disagree68 and take cognizance of the first clause
of the fourth amendment, which contains the broad guarantee that
people shall be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Searches and seizures conducted under a general warrant are prime
examples of what is considered unreasonable, but they are not exclu-
sive examples.69
Achievement of constitutional symmetry in the language of
"search" and "seizure" in the fourth amendment is an apparent
threat in the Payton majority opinion. The language of the fourth
amendment makes no distinction between seizures of things and
indicates what the framers intended to be "unreasonable" searches and seizures. See N. LAS-
SON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 100-03 (1937).
65. In Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1949) the court stated that
at common law the breaking of doors to effect a warrantless arrest was lawful only if necessary.
This reading of the common law fails to mention that arresting a suspect for a felony was a
form of necessity. Thus, entry was permitted at common law. See Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 693, 798 (1924). An examination of common law commenta-
tors yields no definitive rule. See Recent Development, Warrantless Arrests by Police Survives
a Constitutional Challenge: United States v. Watson, 14 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 193, 210-11 (1976);
Note, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Home Arrests, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1550, 1551-53
(1978); Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrandess Arrest - The Eroding Protection ofthe
Castle, 82 DICK. L. REV. 167, 168 n.5 (1977).
66. I.J. CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 51-59 (5th Amer. ed. 1847); 2 M. HALE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 75-84, 90-92 (London 1736); Wilgus, supra note 65, at 558, 685, 800-04.
See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV.
46, 49. The common law of search required a warrant prior to entry into the home to search
for evidence of a crime. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 292 (1803); M. DALTON, THE
COUNTRY JUSTICE 186-87 (2d ed. 1619); STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 359 (1845).
67. See Comment, Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest. The Eroding Protection
ofthe Castle, 82 DICK. L. REv. 167, 169 (1977). See generally Watson & Ramey, The Balance
of Interests in Non-Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 838, 846 (1976). See J.
LADYNsI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 49 (1966); T. TAYLOR, TWO
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
68. See N. LASSON, supra note 64. See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 359-64, 396-400 (1974).
69. • "To suppose they meant to preserve to their posterity by guarantees of liberty written
with the broadest latitude nothing more than hedges against the recurrence of particular forms
of evils suffered at the hands of a monarchy beyond the seas seems to me implausible in the
extreme." Amsterdam, supra note 68, at 399.
seizures of persons, and an arrest is indisputably the seizure of a per-
son.7" This linguistic symmetry, however, does not mandate the con-
clusion that the framers intended to reject the different rules
governing the two types of search and seizure at common law.
7
1
Nevertheless, arguably the framers did not intend to sanction specific
existing practices, but hoped to provide a flexible framework to in-
sure broad guarantees of liberty in the future.72
Despite the Supreme Court's willingness to use the common law
as an important tool in evaluating current police practices, 73 the
meaning of the Constitution may not be stifled by its literal text or by
its past".7  A majority of the Court expressly acknowledges that the
common law of 1791 fails to encompass the growth of the fourth
amendment in modem jurisprudence75 and accords the common law
little, if any, weight in resolution of the fourth amendment problem.
B. Prior Supreme Court Rulings
The Payton majority and dissenters both examined the rele-
vance of United States v. Watson,76 which upheld a warrantless ar-
rest in public absent exigent circumstances, and invoked the
overriding need of society for effective law enforcement. The Wat-
son Court deferred to the nearly unanimous judgment of courts, leg-
islatures, and writers, and categorized the decision as a "necessary
accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the
State's duty to control crime."7 7 Thus, the common inquiry in the
warrantless public arrest and warrantless home entry arrest situa-
tions was whether the fourth amendment protection against unrea-
sonable seizures justified the imposition of a procedural burden on
police activity.
According to the Payton majority, entry into the home to arrest
70. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
71. See note 67 and accompanying text supra
72. The fourth amendment's standard of probable cause is more strict than the common
law standard of mere suspicion. Thus, the framers intended at least one departure from the
common law.
73. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Justice Marshall, with whom Justice
Brennan joined, dissented from the majority's almost mechanical application of the common
law to modem criminal procedure. "While we can learn from the common law, the ancient
rule does not provide a simple answer directly transferable to our system." Id. at 442. See also
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (common law used to determine whether the fourth
amendment guaranteed a post-arrest probable cause hearing by the magistrate).
74. This may have been Chief Justice Marshall's concern when he announced the Court's
power to be final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. "[W]e must never forget that it is
a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819). See also Amsterdam, supra note 68, at 362. "I[T]he Constitution 'states. . .principles
for an expanding future' and a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth." Id (footnote omitted).
75. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33. The dissenters in Payon place major
emphasis on common law rules permitting warrantless arrests in the home.
76. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
77. Id at 418 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975)).
a suspect presented the more complicated issue of warrantless intru-
sion into personal privacy; the majority therefore relied on Court
decisions dealing with the propriety of official intrusion into the pri-
vacy of the home.7" This view marks a major dichotomy in the ra-
tionale of the majority and the dissent. The dissent argued that a
minimal intrusion occurred upon entry to the house in comparison
to the major intrusion accompanying any personal seizure,7 9 and
simply focused on the officer's act of crossing over the threshold
rather than on the intrusive effect of his presence in the home. The
dissent deemphasized fourth amendment search cases that indicated
the constitutional limits of intrusion into privacy8" and thus glossed
over the notion that a suspect arrested in his home has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.81 Supreme Court opinions have continually
recognized that this expectation should be treated with a unique
sensitivity.82
Neither the majority nor the dissenters in Payton discuss the
practical implications of warrantless entry into the home. The Court
has long recognized three corollaries to entry to arrest. These three
exceptions authorize warrantless searches following an entry to ar-
rest and substantially intrude upon privacy interests. First, the
"plain view" doctrine gives police the authority to seize evidence in
open view if police presence is authorized.83 In the arrest context,
this doctrine allows police freedom to seize evidence open to obser-
vation. Second, the "search incident to arrest" doctrine allows an
78. 445 U.S. at 590. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra
79. Id at 615. Since a home arrest is not visible to one's neighbors, it might be consid-
ered less offensive to the individual than a public arrest.
80. Searches are arguably more objectionable than arrests because they invade the pri-
vacy of persons other than the suspect. Under the doctrines of search incident to an arrest, or
plain view, however, warrantless home arrests can have this effect on those who are present or
reside in the home. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1977); text
accompanying notes 83-84 ,frz
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court outlined the
constitutional criteria that limit warrantless intrusions into personal property. According to
Justice Harlan, a search warrant is required when two tests are met: "[F]irst that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Sig-
nificantly, since the Katz decision, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, at least with respect to personal property.
See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
82. United States v. Martines-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Silverman v. United Stats, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1885). Protection for the privacy of the home under the fourth amendment is only part of
a larger constitutional protection for the privacy and sanctity of an individual's home. See,
e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of family to live together in
the home); Moreno v. Department of Agriculture, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (food stamps cannot be
given only to households composed solely of related individuals); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (right to possess obscene material in the home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (protection of the privacy of the "marital bedroom").
83. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
arresting officer to search the arrestee's person and the immediate
surrounding area to prevent seizure of a weapon or destruction of
evidence. 4 This exception has a more intrusive effect in home ar-
rests than in public arrests. A search incident to a home arrest ex-
tends beyond the arrestee's person to various objects and areas in the
home, 5 but a search incident to a public arrest generally extends
only to the suspect's person including those personal possessions in
his control at the time of arrest and to public areas.8 6 Third, the
"inevitable discovery" doctrine allows admission at trial of evidence
discovered through leads obtained in an illegal search, if such evi-
dence could have been discovered eventually by standard police pro-
cedure.8 7 The courts appear to be most reluctant to find that any
legitimate method of investigation is not a standard procedure.88 In
retrospect, most illegally obtained evidence could have been ob-
tained through legal means. The "inevitable discovery" doctrine
seems to condone general searches conducted subsequent to an ar-
rest, which increase the intrusion on the occupants.
All three exceptions afford the home entry to arrest the charac-
ter of a search 9 and dictate the applicability of fourth amendment
84. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
85. Even when properly applied, the "search incident to arrest" doctrine can allow police
to rummage through dressers, beds, closets, and other objects and areas in the home within the
arrestee's reach. If the exception is misapplied, it can be used to allow searches of objects and
areas in the home that are not within the suspect's grasp. See Aaronson & Wallace, A Recon-
sideration ofthe Fourth Amendment's Doctine ofSearch Incident to Arrest, 64 GEO. L.J. 53, 70-
72, 71 n.123 (1975). An example of how broad a "search incident to arrest" can become is
demonstrated by the "protective sweep" search, which has been approved by many federal and
state courts. See Note, Watson and Santana: Death Knellfor Arrest Warranit?, 28 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 787, 803-04 (1977). This doctrine allows police who have effected a valid home arrest
to view the general area to be certain that no additional parties are present who could interfere
with the arrest or attack the officers. Id at 803. The doctrine has been justified by the courts
as a necessary extension of the "search incident to arrest" doctrine. Id The majority of cases
simply allow an unrestricted visual search of the house whenever the police express a fear of
being ambushed by confederates of the arrestee. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 577 F.2d
1147 (4th Cir. 1978). In United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980), the court
stated that defendant's arrest just outside his residence was not a controlling element in deter-
mining whether his rights were violated by a warrantless sweep search of his residence. The
court employed the exigent circumstance exception to permit a protective search of all or part
of the residence if the officers reasonably believed that other persons possibly on the premises
could pose some danger.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16-17 & n.2 (1977) (locked footlock-
er may not be "searched incident to a public arrest").
87. This doctrine is an extension of the "independent discovery doctrine," which allows
evidence to be used against the victim of an illegal search if the prosecutor proves that the
evidence was actually discovered by using legally obtained leads. See Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (dictum).
88. See, e.g., People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 316-17, 380 N.E.2d 224,233, 408 N.Y.S.2d
395, 403-04 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (interviewing hundreds of gun dealers was a stan-
dard police procedure although police testified that such a procedure was never utilized
before).
89. The Paton dissent summarily rejected the notion that warrantless arrests could oper-
ate in the guise of a search. 445 U.S. at 611. Nevertheless, permitting such warrantless entries
could vest unchecked power in the police, thus increasing the possibility of a "timed arrest." A
"timed arrest" is an arrest that police schedule for a time at which they hope to discover not
search cases. Although the Payton majority cited prior search cases
to bolster its general proposition that intrusion into the home de-
mands the use of the warrant procedure, it failed to specify the im-
plications that flow from allowing law enforcement officers to cross
the threshold of a home. Similarly, by virtually ignoring the applica-
bility of prior search cases, the dissenters exposed the weakness of
their position. Allowing police entry to search for a person inevita-
bly leads to a potential wide-range search for things. Thus, prior
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning arrest and search are
applicable to the resolution of the entry to arrest issue.
C. Judicial and Legislative Consensus
The dissenters in Payton urged a finding of constitutionality
based upon the "consensus" 9 of state statutes and court decisions
authorizing warrantless house felony arrests.9 ' Although a majority
of states support warrantless entries into the house to effect an arrest,
the majority noted "a significant decline during the last decade in the
number of States permitting warrantless entries for arrest."92
The crux of this disagreement is the amount of weight to be
accorded widespread acceptance of a particular law enforcement
practice. Certainly, when the "traditional and almost universal stan-
dard"93 in the several states supports the practice, the Court should
give considerable weight to the consensus position. When the prac-
tice is accepted by a bare majority or the position is being eroded by
recent thoughtful defections, however, the Court is entitled to give
substantially less weight to the consensus view. On numerous occa-
sions, the Court has held widespread legislative policies and court
practices unconstitutional. 94 In doing so, the Court has recognized
that constitutional judgment cannot ultimately rest on the uncritical
acceptance of widely held, longstanding legislative and judicial de-
only the suspect, but also evidence of a crime. A timed arrest could take a number of possible
forms. Police might, for example, refrain from arresting a suspect until the suspect has entered
his home in the hope that, upon entry to arrest, they will discover evidence in plain view or
during a search incident to arrest. Police might also refrain from arresting a suspect who is in
his home until they believe evidence for which there is no probable cause to search is in fact
therein.
90. Id at 614.
91. The majority and the dissenters also quibbled about whether federal statutes author-
ized warrantless home felony arrests. The dissent noted that "the absence of any explicit ex-
ception [in federal statutory law] for the home ...is persuasive evidence that Congress
intends to authorize warrantless arrests there as well as elsewhere." Id at 618. The majority,
failing to find a specific "congressional determination that warrantless entries into the home
are 'reasonable'...", concluded that warrantless arrests have no statutory foundation. Id at
589. See note 50 supra
92. 445 U.S. at 599. See note 50 supra.
93. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 422 (quoting ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1 at 289 (1975)).
94. 445 U.S. at 430.
terminations. Decisions on constitutionality cannot rest on a major-
ity vote determined by a roll call of state courts and legislatures.
III. Between Payton and Steagald: The Open Issue of Entry Into
A Third Party's Home to Arrest
The Court in Payton did not address whether law officers have
authority to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect in the
absence of exigent circumstances. Payton mandated the dual re-
quirement of probable cause and an arrest warrant to legitimate the
arrest of a suspect in his home absent an emergency. The Court re-
fused to sanction the additional requirement of a search warrant be-
cause the requirement of an arrest warrant would "suffice to
interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between
the zealous officer and citizen."9" Accordingly, a valid arrest warrant
implicitly authorized "the opening of doors" to officers executing the
warrant when probable cause existed to believe the suspect was
within.9 6 Since the privacy concerns of the third party in the sanctity
of his home are separate and distinct from those of a suspect present
as a visitor, the issue is whether the guidelines established in Payton
are sufficient to satisfy those interests.
A. Common Law Analysis.
The Supreme Court in Payton noted that although "[a] long-
standing widespread practice is not immune from constitutional
scrutiny[,]. . . neither is it to be lightly brushed aside. This is partic-
ularly so when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the
word 'reasonable' and when custom and contemporary norms play
such a large role in constitutional analysis."'97 While not completely
dispositive of the issue,98 the common law is relevant to determine
the framers' view of reasonable permissible conduct in the third
party situation. The English common law conferred a duty to report
felonies to the authorities.99 Upon demand, citizens of the realm had
to assist a police officer in the apprehension of a felon."°° This duty
has continued to modern times, except when constitutional privilege
95. Id. at 601.
96. In essence, if an arrest warrant was issued, probable cause was present and thus it
was constitutional for the police to enter the suspect's premises.
97. Id. at 600.
98. Id at 601.
99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696-97 (1972).
100. 1 J. BISHOP, NEw COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 469 (8th ed. 1892); 1 J.
CHrrTY, CRIMINAL LAW 17 (1816); 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 588 (1678); 2 W. HAw-
KdNS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 116 (6th ed. 1787). Refusal to comply could result in official
sanctions against a recalcitrant party. This "act of responsible citizenship," Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966), undoubtedly influenced the development of the modem
crime of concealing a person from arrest.
protects noncompliance. 10
The emergent common law principle apparently authorized exe-
cution of an arrest warrant by forcible entry into the home of a third
party after both proper notice of authority and purpose and demand
for entry have been given. 02 This authorization, which has its roots
in forcible entry to execute civil process,"0 3 was extended to forcible
entry and search for an individual who fled to or who was present in
the home of a third party or who resided there with the owner's per-
mission. Thus, entry was proper to lawfully execute upon the person
of one who sought refuge in a third party's home," 4
If entry was permissible in the civil context, it certainly was per-
missible in furtherance of criminal process.'0 5 The state interest in
apprehension of felons outweighed the interests attending the third
party home. The home could not be granted a privileged status to
defeat or obstruct the execution of the crown's process."°c It is
doubtful that this predisposition was lost on the framers of the fourth
amendment. 07 At common law a search warrant was not required
prior to execution of an arrest warrant on third party premises. The
common law, however, is to be viewed in light of evolving fourth
amendment interpretation.108
B. Conflict Among the Courts.
In Wallace v. King, 09 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit rejected the Payton rule for entries into third
party homes. Standing alone, reasonable or probable cause to be-
lieve that a person who was the subject of the arrest warrant was on
the premises was insufficient. The majority did not specify all the
additional circumstances that may justify such an entry, but did
101. See Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 1363 (1980).
102. Wilgus, supra note 65, at 801-02; 1 J. CHrrrY, supra note 100, at 57; 2 M. HALE, sMpra
note 100, at 117.
103. Both Chitty and Hale relied upon Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603), a
leading case on the authority of officers breaking into the private dwellings in the execution of
civil process. Chitty also cited to Hale. I J. CHriY, supra note 100, at 57.
104. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198-99 (K.B. 1603) (dictum on executing upon the
person).
105. 1 J. CHrrry, supra note 100, at 57; 1 M. HALE, supra note 100, at 117.
106. An arrest warrant is the modem-day equivalent of such process. It has been defined
as a written judicial order, in the name of the state, signed by an authorized judicial officer,
and commanding the arrest of the individual named for the criminal offense therein charged.
Id
107. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 596-97.
108. The Court "has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement
practices that existed at the time of the fourth amendment passage." Id at 590-91 n.33.
109. 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs, who filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1976)
were two married couples whose residences were briefly searched without search warrants by a
local police officer seeking to apprehend a woman named in a valid arrest warrant. The wo-
man was being sought for refusing to obey a court order in a domestic relations matter con-
cerning the custody of her infant child. Each of the homes was entered after the woman's
estranged husband told police that he had reason to believe she was on the premises.
mention exigent circumstances, the consent of the third party, and a
search warrant as the most likely candidates. The court specifically
limited Payton's holding to the suspect's dwelling, and asserted that
the arrest warrant provided no basis to believe the suspect was
within a stranger's home.
In United States v. Adams," ° however, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit' held that police need either a war-
rant or the presence of exigent circumstances before entering a third
party's home to arrest a suspect on probable cause. The Payton prin-
ciple protecting the sanctity of the home was equally applicable to
third party premises. Since the privacy interests of the party in his
home were equated with those of a suspect in his own residence,
Payton dictated that law officers satisfy the comparable dual require-
ment of an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe the suspect
was present.
When law enforcement officers desire to enter a third party
home to arrest a suspect who is not a resident, they should not be
entitled to assume the suspect is within the third party home. Noth-
ing in the process of procuring an arrest warrant for the suspect af-
fords any protection for the entirely distinct fourth amendment right
of the resident, since the warrant requires only a prior judicial deter-
nination that probable cause exists to arrest a named person for a
certain offense.
The police intrusion into the privacy of a third party home re-
quires that police meet a more stringent standard in the absence of
exigent circumstances: probable cause to believe that a suspect com-
mitted a particular crime and that the suspect will be found within
the particular home. The potential for abuse is more substantial in
cases concerning arrests on third party premises than in cases similar
to Payton. The absence of a preliminary judicial determination of
110. 621 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1980). In Adams, the defendant was charged with harboring an
escaped convict. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents entered the defendant's apartment
without a warrant and discovered the fugitive in a closet. Although the agents had probable
cause to believe the suspect was inside, nothing indicated that she was armed or likely to flee.
Thus, the court held that nothing excused the agents' failure to get a warrant or to stake out the
apartment until a warrant was procured.
111. Another divergent viewpoint was echoed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1980). The Court
analogized the arrest warrant to a search warrant in its legal effect. Both a procedural and a
substantive reason were cited for rejecting a suppression motion based on a claim that a detec-
tive who retrieved incriminating evidence from a ledge outside a second floor apartment had
no business being there. While the detective had neither a search warrant for the apartment
nor an arrest warrant for the defendant, he may have possessed a warrant for the defendant's
brother, whom the detective and others had come to the apartment to arrest. By failing to
inquire into the existence of such a warrant at the suppression hearing, the defense failed to
shift to the Government the burden of justifying the officer's presence on the ledge. Alterna-
tively, the majority concluded that under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the defendant
had no expectation of privacy with respect to the ledge.
the probable culpability of the owner of the residence occasions this
result.
As a general rule, before entering a specific place to conduct a
search for objects, police officers must obtain a search warrant,"
2
which insures a prior judicial determination of probable cause to be-
lieve the object sought is within the place to be searched." 3 Further-
more, four years ago, the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment does not forbid issuance of a warrant to search for crim-
inal evidence reasonably believed present on the premises of a third
party who is not suspected of involvement in the underlying
crime." I4 The Court reiterated that the critical element of a "reason-
able search" is not that the owner is suspected of a crime, but that
reasonable cause exists to believe the things searched for and seized
are located on the property to be entered." 5 The homeowner's pri-
vacy interest is similar" 16 whether the search is for a suspect or for
criminal evidence."
7
The arbitrary invasion of the privacy of the home is the chief
evil to which the fourth amendment is directed."t 8 To prevent such
invasions, the framers interposed a search warrant requirement be-
tween private citizens and the police. The warrant requirement re-
flects a belief that, absent special circumstances, the decision whether
the right to privacy must yield to a right to enter and search a partic-
ular place rests with a disinterested judicial officer, not with the po-
112. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1925).
113. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
114. Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
115. Id at 568 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe magistrate must judge the reasonableness
of every warrant in light of the circumstances of the particular case, carefully considering the
description of evidence sought, the situation of the premises, and the position and interests of
the owner or occupant"). Congress limited the effect of Zurcher by passing the Privacy Protec-
tion Act, which forbids government officers or employees to search for or seize any "work
product" or "documentary" material possessed by a journalist or author except under specific
circumscribed conditions. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879, 1883
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa-2000aa-12 (Supp. 1980)). The Act does not forbid a search
for work product material if there is probable cause to believe the person possessing the mater-
ials committed or was committing the crime under investigation, or if there is reason to believe
seizure is necessary to prevent death or serious injury. Id at § 2000aa. For non-work product
material, consideration is given to the likely effect of a subpoena.
The Attorney General must issue guidelines governing other third party searches. Id. at
§ 2000aa-11. The guidelines must analyze personal privacy interests, require the least intru-
sive method, recognize special privacy concerns attending confidential relationships, and re-
quire that any non-emergency search warrant applications be approved by an attorney for the
government. Guidelines represent a compromise between the House version, which applied to
all parties, and the Senate bill, which was limited to the press. See S. REP. No. 96-874, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3950, 3954-55.
116. This assumes that the third party is not connected with the alleged criminal activity.
As the Court has often pointed out, the results of an illegal search never justify the search. See,
e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
117. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), which appears to make no distinction
between the two situations. It implies that an arrest warrant would be required if exigent
circumstances were not present.
118. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
lice. 119 A prior judicial determination should control a contemplated
entry of a third party home regardless of what is sought. A search
warrant would be required to enter a residence to search for objects
carried into it.
Consequently, the rules governing searches should apply with
equal force to an entry to arrest in a third party home. The occupant
or owner of the premises to be searched would benefit from a search
warrant because evidence that the suspect as the "person to be
seized" is on the premises would be required and principles of stale-
ness would be applicable. 20 Without this warrant, the arrest entry
would be permissible only if exigent circumstances 121 or some other
established exception to the warrant requirement were present. Any
other result would endorse police circumvention of the search war-
rant requirement by use of the arrest warrant to search any premises
in which the police claim they have probable cause to believe a sus-
pect is being concealed.
22
In balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the
potential abuse and intrusions of privacy, modem courts weigh in
favor of the search warrant requirement in the third party situation.
This requirement does not hinder effective law enforcement or raise
the spectre of potential danger to the officer and bystander. 123 The
search warrant requirement would yield when immediate action was
necessary or when consent was procured. Therefore, this higher bur-
119. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
120. A magistrate may permit a maximum often days in which to search. FED. R. CRum.
P. 41(c). Usually, however, a search warrant becomes "stale" because police no longer have
probable cause to believe that the item is in the place to be searched.
121. See notes 162-187 and accompanying text mfra
122. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969). Cf. United States v. Gaultney,
606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (An officer need not make an additional trip for a search warrant
if the officer has determined that the suspect is within the premises.). But see Vasquez v. Snow,
616 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1980) (arrest warrant could not sanction pursuit into a private residence
because of the substantial likelihood that the suspect was at a location other than the target
residence.).
123. Federal law enforcement officers may now obtain a search warrant without the affi-
ant personally appearing before the issuing judicial officer. Rule 41(c)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure authorizes a magistrate to issue a search warrant based upon sworn oral
testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means "[ilf the circumstances
make it reasonable to dispense with the written affidavit." Federal investigative agents and
attorneys can telephone or radio a magistrate and contemporaneously obtain a search warrant.
At least two state jurisdictions have authorized telephonic search warrants. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West Supp. 1974); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3914 (Supp.
1973). The Supreme Court and Congress sought to make obtaining a search warrant "admin-
istratively feasible" when circumstances and administrative obstacles hinder acquisition of a
warrant through the traditional method of requiring the affiant to personally appear before a
magistrate. This amendment is consistent with the Supreme Court's oft-stated position favor-
ing the use of search warrants. The statement of probable cause, whether in support of a
telephone or traditional warrant, serves as a basis for a later judicial determination of its legal-
ity. The scope of the area searched and items seized may be examined in relation to the
warrant. See, eg., United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
growd, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
den is justified because no other mechanism exists to protect the in-
terest of the persons whose premises are being searched.
IV. Steagald v. United States: Facts, Holding, and Rationale 24
4. The Circuit Court Decision
On January 4, 1978, Special Agent Joseph Rassey of the Federal
Drug Enforcement Administration, (DEA) in Detroit, Michigan, was
contacted by an informant. The confidential informant advised that
he might be able to locate a "Ricky Lyons" whom he believed to be
sought by the DEA. 25 On January 14, 1978, the informant con-
tacted the agent again and communicated a telephone number in the
Atlanta, Georgia vicinity where, according to the informant, Ricky
Lyons could be reached during the next twenty-four hours. 26 Be-
tween January 16, 1978, and January 18, 1978, Agent Rassey re-
ceived several telephone calls from his informant, confirming that
Ricky Lyons was still at the location of the telephone number.'27
This information was passed to DEA Agent Kelly Goodowens in
Atlanta, who contacted Southern Bell Telephone Company and se-
cured the address corresponding to the telephone number supplied
by the informant.
28
On January 18, 1978, Goodowens and approximately eleven
other officers drove to the address. Upon approaching the house, the
officers observed two men located near the rear of a parked Volk-
swagon. 129 These men were Gary Steagald and Hoyt Gaultney. The
officers frisked both men, demanded identification, and determined
that neither man was Lyons. 3 Both men were detained pending
another agent's return from the residence.'
3'
The agent arrived at the residence, knocked on the door, and
advised Gaultney's wife, who answered the door, that he had an ar-
rest warrant. 32 Mrs. Gaultney stated that no one by the name of
Ricky Lyons was in the house. She was, nevertheless, guarded in the
position of hands placed against the wall, while another agent con-
ducted a sweep search.' 33 Ricky Lyons was not found, but during
the search the agent observed a set of triple beam balance scales, a
124. 606 F.2d 540 (1979).
125. The informant also advised that he might be able to locate an individual named
"Jimmy" whom he believed was wanted on state drug charges in Georgia. Id. at 542.
126. The informant specified he had spoken to "Jimmy" and was given the telephone
number where Jimmy and Ricky Lyons could be found. Id at 542-43.
127. Id at 542.
128. Id at 543. Goodowens also discovered that Lyons was the subject of a six month
arrest warrant.




133. Id at 543-44.
clear plastic bag containing a white powder, and a box containing a
roll of clear plastic bags. Upon being informed of the possible dis-
covery of cocaine, Agent Goodowens sent an officer to obtain a
search warrant and in the interim conducted a second search of the
residence. Additional incriminating evidence was uncovered.
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During a third search conducted pursuant to a search warrant, the
agents uncovered a variety of narcotics processing paraphernalia and
forty-three pounds of almost pure cocaine.
The trial judge denied a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence
uncovered during the various searches on the ground that it was ille-
gally obtained because the agents failed to procure a search war-
rant. ' 5 A divided Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the denial of the suppression motion. 36 The court relied on a previ-
ous Fifth Circuit decision, which held that "when an officer holds a
valid arrest warrant and reasonably believes that its subject is within
premises belonging to a third party, he need not obtain a search war-
rant to enter for the purpose of arresting the subject."' 137  Circuit
Judge Clark reiterated that the test is properly framed in terms of the
officer's reasonable belief. '3  Thus, the agents had objective grounds
for forming a reasonable belief that a fugitive was present at a third
party's residence, and a warrantless entry was proper even though
the fugitive named in the arrest warrant was not found on the prem-
ises at the moment of entry.
39
Circuit Judge Kravitch dissented because the information
known to the agents was insufficient to establish a reasonable belief
that the person named in the arrest warrant could be found in the
house to be searched.' On the petition for rehearing,' 41 Judge
Kravitch dissented from the majority's rationale that the informant's
past reliability and mode of accumulating his information provided
a sufficient basis*for the government agent to conclude that the in-
134. The agent observed what appeared to be more bags of white powder partially visible
inside a green garbage bag lying in an open suitcase on the bed.
135. Id. at 540.
136. Circuit Judges Thornberry and Clark affirmed the lower court opinion. Circuit
Judge Kravitch concurred in part and dissented in part.
137. United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
138. "Reasonable belief embodies the same standards of reasonableness [as does probable
cause] but allows the officer who has already been to the magistrate to secure an arrest warrant,
to determine that the suspect is probably within certain premises without an additional trip to
the magistrate and without exigent circumstances." 606 F.2d at 544.
139. The court of appeals upheld the refusal by the district court to order that the govern-
ment provide the defendant's expert witness with a primary reference sample for use in an
independent drug analysis. The court of appeals additionally held that the evidence was suffi-
cient to sustain the convictions. The district court did not err in failing to dismiss the indict-
ment on the premise of double jeopardy, nor in giving a supplemental charge to the jury. Id
at 545-48.
140. Id. at 548.
141. 615 F.2d 642 (1980).
formant was reliable and the information provided was credible.'42
Judge Kravitch contended that the majority's proclamation was a
"rule of questionable validity and wisdom" and represented a "dis-
turbing erosion of the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties."1
43
B. Supreme Court Holding and Rationale
In Steagald v. United States," ' the Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment requires police to obtain a search warrant before
entering the home of a third party, absent the owner's consent or
exigent circumstances. Writing for himself and five other Justices,
14 1
Justice Marshall noted at the outset that the Government was pre-
cluded from contending that petitioner Steagald lacked an expecta-
tion of privacy in the searched home because the argument was
never raised in the lower courts. The Court concluded that the Gov-
ernment, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence, lost
its right to challenge the standing of petitioner to litigate the merits
of his claim. 46
The Court subsequently identified the narrow issue as whether
an arrest warrant-as opposed to a search warrant-adequately pro-
tects the fourth amendment interests of persons unnamed in the war-
rant. Specifically, the Court asserted two distinct interests affected
by the search-Lyons' interest in freedom from an unreasonable
seizure and the petitioner's interest in freedom from an unreasonable
search.'47 The Court relied on the consistent teaching of the fourth
amendment that in the absence of exigent circumstances, "judicially
untested determinations are not reliable enough to justify an entry
into a person's home to arrest him without a warrant, or a search of a
home for objects in the absence of a search warrant. 48 The Court
could not justify a departure from this view when the search was for
a person rather than an object.
149
142. Id at 643.
143. Id at 644.
144. 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
145. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan, Stew-
art, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment.
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice White joined.
146. 101 S. Ct. at 1647. See notes 188-245 and accompanying text bnfra
147. 101 S. Ct. at 1647-50.
148. Id at 1648.
149. Id Justice Marshall admitted that Payton sanctioned a limited form of home entry
accomplished by an arrest w,.-rant alone. He noted,
Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it
necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it
is necessary to arrest him in his home... .Because it does not authorize the police
to deprive the third person of his liberty, it cannot embody any derivative authority
to deprive this person of his interest in the privacy of his home.
Id at 1649 n.7.
Justice Marshall was troubled by the potential abuse created by
a contrary conclusion.
Armed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the police
could search all the homes of the individual's friends and ac-
quaintances. . . moreover, an arrest warrant may serve as a pre-
text for entering a home in which the police may have a suspicion,
but not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking
place.150
The majority found the common law provided little help in de-
ciding whether an arrest warrant was adequate to protect the fourth
amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant.15 Al-
though the majority agreed with the Government that the warrant
requirement would cause police some "inconvenience," the majority
emphasized that as a practical matter law enforcement efforts would
not be significantly impeded. 52 An arrest warrant alone sufficed to
enter a suspect's own residence and if probable cause existed, no
warrant was necessary to apprehend in a public place. Exigent cir-
cumstances would justify many warrantless entries. 153 Furthermore,
in most routine cases, the time necessary to obtain a search warrant
would not hinder efforts to apprehend felons. Finally, telephonic
warrants were a viable alternative.'
54
The majority added that the practical problems did not out-
weigh the constitutional interest at stake. "The additional burden
imposed on the police by a warrant requirement is minimal. In con-
trast, the right protected-that of presumptively innocent people to
be secure in their homes from unjustified, forcible intrusions by the
Government-is weighty."'155
In dissent, Justices Rehnquist and White questioned the logic of
the majority opinion and noted that the majority conveniently ig-
nored the critical factor in the case--the existence of an arrest war-
rant for a fugitive believed on the basis of probable cause to be in the
dwelling. "Concluding. .. the arrest warrant did not address the
privacy interest affected by the search by no means ends the matter;
it simply presents the issue for decision."' 156 Resolution of this issue,
the dissenters claimed, warranted a balancing of the need to search
against the contemplated invasion.157 The dissenters argued that
reasonableness is the ultimate standard and that "the existence of a
150. Id at 1649.
151. Id at 1651-52.
152. Id at 1652. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). "The mere fact that law
enforcement may be more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id at 393.
153. 101 S. Ct. at 1652.
154. Id See FED. RULE CRIM. PROc. 41(c)(1) & (2); note 123 supra.
155. 101 S. Ct. at 1653.
156. Id.
157. Id at 1654.
valid arrest warrant is highly relevant" in determining the reasona-
bleness of dispensing with a search warrant.15 8 The arrest warrant
assures occupants that the search is authorized and that its scope is
limited. Thus, the arrest warrant served some of the functions a sep-
arate search warrant would serve. 15 9
Furthermore, the dissenters noted that the common law prece-
dents typically concerned a third party's right to resist the officer's
attempted entry, or to resist the offense committed by the officer after
entrance against the third party. They concluded that entry into a
third party's home to arrest was considered a fortiori from the ac-
cepted entry into the suspect's own home. At common law, criminal
process unlocked all doors. 160
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
burden on law enforcement.
The genuinely unfortunate aspect of today's ruling is not that
fewer fugitives would be brought to book, or fewer criminals ap-
prehended, though both of these consequences will undoubtedly
occur; the greater misfortune is the increased uncertainty imposed
on police officers in the field, committing magistrates, and trial
judges, who must confront variations and permutations of this fac-
tual situation on a day-to-day basis.'
6'
V. Unanswered Questions of Payton v. New York
A. The Defnition of "'Home"
The Payton decision used three terms to describe the premises
that can be entered only with a warrant absent exigent circum-
stances-"residence," "home," and "dwelling." The precise mean-
ing of these terms is not clear from the opinion. Payton does not
indicate when its warrant requirement applies to premises occupied
on a temporary basis. The Steagald dissenters recognized this prob-
lem when they stated that a person's residence can acquire the status
of a "home" in "a few days."'' 62 Therefore, lower courts must wres-
tle with determining what type of warrant is required for the particu-
lar premises.
The Supreme Court decision of Katz v. United States 63 com-
pounds the problem. In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice
Harlan delineated the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test" for
determining whether an interest demands fourth amendment protec-
158. Id
159. Id at 1656.
160. Id at 1657.
161. Id
162. Id
163. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
164. Id at 361.
tion. 65  His test has been consistently applied by the courts. The
holding in Katz illustrates the Court's movement away from inflexi-
ble concepts of property law166 to a more realistic standard based on
societal norms. Several factors have emerged to determine whether
a reasonable expectation of privacy exists: the nature of the premises
or activity; 67 the extent of the personal interest in the premises;
68
the steps taken by a person to maintain the privacy of an area or
activity;' 69 and society's characterization of the place and activity.'
70
Thus, the courts have applied these factors and recognized a reason-
able expectation of privacy in one's dormitory room,'
7 ' office,' 72
home, 173 apartment, 74 hotel room, 75 and locked common areas, 
76
but have denied a privacy expectation in open doorways 77 and in
items in plain view.
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165. Although Justice Harlan did not use this precise phrase, it is the phrase used by the
courts in applying his test.
166. In Katz, the Court overruled Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940) and
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which advanced the trespass and constitution-
ally protected area theories.
167. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). "Expectation of privacy
with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office."
Id at 367.
168. A possessory interest, however, is not the sine qua non of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Courts have recognized that "a reasonable expectation of privacy in the enjoyment of
a place or object may attach where there is little or no proprietary interest." United States v.
Hunt, 505 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975). See, e.g., Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (expectation of privacy in desk used by defendant); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (expectation of privacy in telephone booth).
169. Eg., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (placing personal effects inside
of a double-locked footlocker). Conversely, failure to take reasonable steps to protect one's
privacy may result in the loss of the fourth amendment's protection. See, e.g., United States v.
Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973) (no expectation of
privacy when apartment door is left ajar).
170. United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921
(1973) ("[s]ociety invests a hotel room... with that special character of intimacy justifying its
characterization as a private place"). The court, however, ruled that the defendant's state-
ments, which were audible in an adjoining room, were admissible because they were not per-
ceived via electronic devices but by the unaided ear. Id This determination may involve a
balancing of society's needs and the individual's privacy interests. See South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[r]esolution of this question
requires a weighing of the governmental and societal interests advanced to justify such intru-
sion against the constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in the privacy of his
effects").
171. See, eg., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971).
172. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
173. See, eg., United States v. Rubin, 343 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 833 (1973).
174. See United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976).
175. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. McKinney, 477
F.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
176. United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 551 (1976).
177. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). The result was supported because the
defendant was standing in the open doorway of her home in plain view of passerby; therefore,
the doorway became a public place not subject to a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Id at
45.
178. The courts have held that simply because an item is in plain view does not automati-
cally justify its warrantless seizure, especially when the item is located in an area entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In situations in which the item is both in plain view and
Avoiding engrafted property law distinctions is consistent with
Payton and Steagald. When no warrant has been obtained and no
exigency exists, courts should evaluate the suspect's claims of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.' 79 In third party situations, courts
should demand the use of a search warrant rather than an arrest
warrant unless the facts clearly demonstrate that the third party
premises have become the suspect's "home."
B. Probable Cause to Believe the Suspect is Present
The majority opinion in Payton states that an arrest warrant
"implicitly carries with it" authority to enter a suspect's dwelling
"when there is reason to believe the suspect is within."' 80 The dis-
sent merely acknowledged that officers "need an extra increment of
probable cause when executing the arrest warrant."'' The lack of
analysis by both the majority and dissenting opinions poses a prob-
lem for courts forced to evaluate an officer's belief that the suspect is
on the premises.
The mobility of persons renders it difficult to determine whether
probable cause exists to believe that a person is in a given place.
Criminals and those suspected of crime are probably no more regu-
lar in their daily routines than the rest of society. To create a pre-
sumption that probable cause to believe a person is at home always
exists is without basis. The presumption would serve no purpose
and would become a mere pro forma addition to a typical arrest war-
rant. Indeed, any presumption in this area could cause a criminal
suspect to avoid his home. As the dissenters in Steagald noted,
"Criminals who know or suspect they are subject to arrest warrants
would not be likely to return to their homes. ... ""2 On the other
hand, equally problematic is the requirement that police accumulate
located in an area entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy, the courts have drawn a
distinction between the observation and the subsequent seizure. Courts reason that mere ob-
servation of something in plain view is not within the fourth amendment's definition of a
search. The physical intrusion into a protected area in order to effect the seizure, however, is
held to a stricter standard; courts normally require a valid search warrant or exigent circum-
stances before an intrusion will be upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Coplen, 541 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977) (visual search from outside of airplane;
warrantless seizure upheld on ground of mobility of plane); State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super.
570, 380 A.2d 728, 733-34 (1977) (visual search of backyard; warrantless seizure of marijuana
unreasonable for lack of exigent circumstances). For a discussion of the effect of Katz on the
plain view doctrine, see Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: 4 Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy or ,4 Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 82-85 (1974).
179. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1979).
180. 445 U.S. at 603.
181. Id. at 616. The dissent noted that to obtain an arrest warrant, officers need only show
probable cause that a crime has been committed and the suspect committed it. The Payton
decision, however, added the element of grounds to believe the suspect is within the dwelling.
Id at 616 n.13.
182. 101 S. Ct. at 1654.
evidence on a suspect's habits or conduct a stake-out of the home to
assure a magistrate that a suspect would be home when they arrived
to execute their warrant. Often such surveillance is not available for
a "routine felony arrest."'
' 8 3
It remains unclear, therefore, how much "cause" officers must
have to execute their warrant and what standards or procedure po-
lice will have to follow. Because of the volume of warrant applica-
tions, the magistrate commonly issues an arrest warrant without any
meaningful probable cause determination.1 84 This practice is inap-
propriate when a home is involved. To adequately protect an indi-
vidual's privacy, the magistrate should be compelled to carefully
determine whether the officer intends to arrest a suspect in his
home.'85 The magistrate should be required to determine whether
the police have probable cause to believe the suspect still uses his
home.18 6 To prescribe a more extensive showing of probable cause
when the warrant is issued is not practicable. The "extra increment"
of probable cause required by Payton should be satisfied if, after the
warrant is issued, the officer is able to identify an independent source
of information to support the belief that the suspect is presently in
his home.
C Impact on United States v. Watson
The most important consequence of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Payton will probably be an increase in the number of arrest
warrants applied for and obtained in felony cases. Even if the sus-
pect's whereabouts are unknown, in light of Payton it would be sen-
183. Justice Stevens used this term to describe the arrests of Payton and Riddick. 445 U.S.
at 574.
184. Professor LaFave has argued persuasively that a high volume of arrest warrants re-
sults in routine approval by the magistrate. "Arrest warrants are commonly issued in the ab-
sence of any meaningful participation by a judicial officer; the judge is likely to sign the arrest
warrant without a careful reading of the complaint or any direct examination of the complain-
ant." LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court- Further Ventures into the "Quag-
mire'" 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 27 (1972). Another commentator would nevertheless support the
warrant process because of the following factors: First, one desirable effect of the warrant
process is to freeze the affiant's story well ahead of the search or arrest; second, it is unrealistic
to assume that magistrates are never "independent" and to the extent they are, certain imper-
missible intrusions will be prevented; third, to the extent the magistrate is committed to the
police view of the criminal process, he still has a valid function to play to advance the ultimate
means of the intrusion by taking pains to see that the requirements of the warrant clause are
met; finally, to require the officer to have a warrant is to remain at least one symbolic step
away from the police state. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People.-
A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 165, 182 n.34.
185. Most judges view their responsibility with regard to search warrants as important.
LaFave, supra note 184, at 27. No reason exists to believe judges would treat warrants prior to
specific police entry to arrest a suspect in the home any differently.
186. Others who dwell in the home deserve protection from harassment. Although any
intrusion into an individual's sphere of privacy would probably overlap the sphere of family
members, a magistrate's determination of probable cause that a suspect uses his home would
protect against unnecessary police intrusions. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 603
(White, J., dissenting).
sible to obtain an arrest warrant. Thus, an erosion of the authority
to make warrantless arrests, which was reinforced in the Watson de-
cision, 18 7 will occur.
Theoretically, the warrantless felony arrest in public places re-
mains unaffected by Payton's requirement of a warrant for an arrest
in the home. As a practical matter, officers may not know when or
where they will find the suspect, although the home remains a likely
place of apprehension. Even if arrest were ultimately to occur in
public, it would be prudent for officers to obtain a warrant. If this
approach is implemented, Payton's reinstatement of the basic prefer-
ence for prior judicial review under the fourth amendment will have
a clear impact beyond the confines of home arrests.
VI. Application of the Exigent Circumstances Doctrine After
Payton and Steagald
Although a warrant is required prior to entry into a home to
arrest, the constitutional rule is not absolute. The Supreme Court
has permitted warrantless entry into the home.18 8 The primary justi-
fication articulated by the Court for many of these warrantless en-
tries is the presence of exigent circumstances. The exigent
circumstances doctrine is a narrow exception to the constitutional
rule approved by the Supreme Court in Payton and Steagald. The
lower courts, however, have developed inconsistent tests broadly in-
terpreting the exigent circumstances exception. Unless comprehen-
sive standards are developed clarifying when warrantless intrusions
are legitimate, the exception may swallow the special fourth amend-
ment protection of the home provided in Payton and Steagald.1
8 9
187. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra
188. In its entire history, the Supreme Court has upheld warrantless entry into a home in
only six cases. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (emergency entry to extinguish fire
permitted); Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (original entry during investigation permit-
ted, subsequent "crime scene" search forbidden); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)
("hot pursuit" justified warrantless entry); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) (warrantless
entry on mistaken identity); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry for
exigent circumstances during course of investigation); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)
(announcement of authority and purpose not a command of the fourth amendment).
189. See State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, - A.2d - (1980). Analogizing the situation to a
"plain view" seizure of evidence, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that police may effect a
warrantless, but probable cause-supported, arrest of a suspect whom they find inside a dwell-
ing being searched pursuant to a warrant. The Court acknowledged that Payton stands for the
proposition that police need either a warrant or exigent circumstances in order to perform a
nonconsensual entry into a dwelling for purposes of arresting the resident. Furthermore, the
court states that the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning expressed in Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), which established a seven factor test to determine the
exigencies of the situation. The Ruth court stated that "an entry to arrest and an entry to
search for and to seize property implicate the same interest in preserving privacy and the
sanctity of the home and justify the same level of constitutional protection." State v. Ruth, 181
Conn. 187, 191, - A.2d -, - (1980). Therefore, the Connecticut court reasoned that once a
search warrant is obtained and the entry is lawful, the police are rightfully present and may
arrest a resident, provided that probable cause exists. The court compared the situation to
A. Denitional Problems-The Supreme Court and Exigent
Circumstances
Exigent circumstances that excuse prior judicial consent to enter
a home are appropriated almost entirely from search and seizure sit-
uations and are attached to the requirements of arrest. ' 90 The histor-
ical source of the doctrine of exigent circumstances is found in
Justice Jackson's dicta in Johnson v. United States.'9'
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it
may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for a search may be
dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered
for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the
officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and
present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very con-
vincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not
enough to bypass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was
fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of a permanent
premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband
was threatened with removal or destruction . .192
Later Supreme Court cases confirmed this early statement of the
exigent circumstances principle. 93 Two cases, Warden v. Hayden'94
and United States v. Santana,'95 clarified that the doctrine applied to
home arrest. In Warden, police responded to a report that an armed
robber had entered a specific house, later determined to be Hayden's
home. Police arrived within five minutes, entered, seized evidence,
and arrested Hayden.'96 Emphasizing the particular facts of the
case, the Court found that the exigencies of the situation necessitated
the police conduct.' 9 7 The Court noted that the fourth amendment
does not require police delay if such delay would endanger lives or
allow a suspect's escape. Similarly, in Santana, the Court reaffirmed
the reasonableness of certain necessary warrantless entries. The exi-
gent circumstance of "hot pursuit"' 9 provided the foundation for
justifying warrantless entry to the suspect's home.
"plain view" discovery and noted that, as in the case of inadvertent discovery of incriminating
evidence, a risk was present that during the time it takes to obtain an arrest warrant, a suspect
might flee because he had been alerted that he was the focus of police investigation. Id.
190. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), in which the Court reviewed its cases on
exigent circumstances. All are search cases and are cited as authority in arrest cases based on
exigent circumstances.
191. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
192. Id at 14-15.
193. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 48 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
194. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
195. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
196. Police scattered throughout the house in their search both for evidence and the sus-
pect. They found Hayden feigning sleep in his bed. 387 U.S. at 298.
197. The majority conspicuously avoided the "hot pursuit" formulation put forward by
the concurring judges, and instead focused on the danger of an armed robber at large. 387
U.S. at 298-99.
198. 427 U.S. at 42-43.
The focus in Santana was on a narcotics transaction between an
undercover agent and dealer. After the dealer's arrest, the police im-
mediately proceeded to the supplier's house, which was two streets
away. After the law enforcement officers identified themselves, the
supplier, who was standing in the frame of her doorway, retreated
into her house. Thereupon, the police rushed in and arrested her.'99
The Court found that Santana was in public view in her doorway
and that her retreat into her house would not be allowed to thwart an
otherwise proper arrest by the pursuing officers.
200
Close analysis of Warden and Santana reveals the use of similar
criteria. First, each case necessitated immediate police action to ap-
prehend the suspect. Next, each case entailed less than ten minutes
between the commission of the crime and police entry to arrest. In
Warden, the armed robber would either harm someone or escape
from the police; in Santana, the suspect might escape or destroy the
evidence.2°" These common criteria suggest simple application of
the exigent circumstances doctrine. The issue, however, is complex.
First, immediacy in investigating a crime is distinguishable from
immediacy in arresting a criminal. In certain situations, it is impera-
tive to get a suspect's description or identity and to get to the crime
scene quickly.20 2 In other instances, prompt investigation is unnec-
essary because, for example, the victim knows the offender. If the
police department anticipates the use of detectives or analytic crime
reports, then police policy has assigned thoroughness a higher prior-
ity than speed in the effectuation of arrests.2 °3 The nature of the
criminal and crime are also relevant. Many suspects are aware that
flight is apt to attract suspicion to them. Furthermore, many crimes
do not require a quick arrest.2 °4
199. During the arrest, some packets of heroin fell from a paper sack that Santana was
holding. The introduction of heroin into evidence was held proper, as it was seized within the
scope of a search incident to an arrest.
200. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980), in which the court held
unlawful the warrantless arrest of a suspect in the doorway of his home. The Ninth Circuit
court relied on Payton and emphasized the special protection that the fourth amendment af-
fords individuals in their homes. The court of appeals distinguished Santana. Although the
warrantless arrest upheld in Santana also occurred in the doorway of a private home, the facts
of Johnson, in which the defendant opened his door after the officers misidentified themselves
and was immediately greeted by drawn guns, required a different result. The Court noted that
the Riddick case discussed in Payton closely paralleled the facts of the case. "Riddick did not
voluntarily expose himself to warrantless arrest by the police as in a public place by allowing
his three-year old son to open the door of his home." Id at 757. Thus, the court concluded
that Johnson did not voluntarily expose himself to warrantless arrest by opening his door to
agents who misrepresented their identities.
201. Cf. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (no exigent circum-
stances to search because of police delay).
202. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE TASK FORCE REPORT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 96-97 (1967).
203. See LaFave, supra note 184, at 22 (frequently arrests on private premises are made
by police during an investigative period).
204. Examples of crimes that do not call for immediacy include white collar crimes, such
Finally, it is an open issue whether police can make a warrant-
less entry to prevent destruction of evidence. Supreme Court dicta
suggest the existence of an independent destruction of evidence ex-
ception. 05 The dicta approve warrantless entry if evidence is
threatened with destruction,2°" if a possibility of imminent destruc-
tion of evidence exists,2" 7 and if evidence is in the process of destruc-
tion.2 °8 Although the Supreme Court has opened the door for
warrantless entries to prevent the destruction of evidence, the Court
as conspiracies involving complex arrangements, and victimless crimes, such as gambling,
drug misuse, and prostitution. Similarly, delayed arrest is sometimes used by police to arrest
many at a later time, instead of only one suspect at an earlier date. It may also be used to
achieve purposes other than arrest for the suspect, e.g., acquisition of sufficient evidence to
convict. See W. LAFAVE, ARREST: DECISION TO TAKE SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 208-24
(1965).
205. The Court has consistently denied certiorari when petitioned to review lower court
decisions that have recognized such an exception. This may reflect the Court's movement
away from the exclusionary rule and represent an unwillingness to curb police action.
206. The Court first recognized that a warrantless entry might be justified when evidence
was threatened with destruction in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948). Lower fed-
eral courts have interpreted this exception to mean that if a threat of removal or destruction of
evidence existed, the warrantless search would have been approved. See United States v.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973). The Court gave further sup-
port for upholding this type of warrantless search in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), in which the evidence seized was threatened with destruction by natural causes. Evi-
dence of blood alcohol content was threatened with destruction; therefore police legitimately
seized that evidence incident to petitioner's arrest. Indeed, as the Court stated, "Search war-
rants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could
be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned." Id at 770. Since the Court
considered the body to be no less protected than a home, the language suggests that a police-
man may enter the home as well as have the body entered to prevent the threatened destruc-
tion of evidence.
207. In United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) the Court suggested that "imminent
destruction of evidence may justify a warrantless search." Id at 52. The Court established
this exception by negative inference only. In Jeffers, a policeman and a hotel detective entered
the defendant's room and seized narcotics. The Court held the search invalid because no
imminent danger of destruction existed at the time.
208. The Supreme Court has also indicated that it might allow warrantless entries into
residences if it could be shown that the officers knew that the evidence was actually in the
process of being destroyed. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), is the case most frequently cited in support of the destruction
exception. The Court invalidated a full-scale search that police attempted to justify by the
destruction of evidence exception. Police arrested the suspect in front of his house, but the
suspect's family returned to the house before the suspect had been taken away. Notwithstand-
ing the risk that the evidence would be destroyed, the Court held that the destruction of evi-
dence was not imminent. The Court also emphasized that the impracticability of obtaining an
arrest warrant was never established. Thus, Vale apparently recognized this exception but
found its application to be inappropriate given the particular facts of this case.
The strongest support for the destruction of evidence exception may be found in United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). The Court characterized the warrantless entry as per-
missible within the hot pursuit exception.
The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any
the less a 'hot pursuit' sufficient to justify the warrantless entry in Santana's house.
Once Santana saw the police, there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay
would result in destruction of evidence. Once she had been arrested the search, inci-
dent to that arrest, which produced the drugs and money was clearly justified.
Id at 43. Traditionally, the hot pursuit and search incident to arrest conditions would have
been independently sufficient to allow a search without a warrant. In the absence of such
conditions, it is unclear whether police could have made a warrantless entry and search for the
sole purpose of preventing the possible destruction of evidence. In dissent, Justice Marshall
recognized a destruction exception: "mhe danger that the evidence would be destroyed and
has not provided clear guidance for application to the fourth
amendment.
B. Exigent Circumstances in the Lower Courts
Lower courts confronted with exigent circumstances questions
take one of two approaches--the "checklist" standard or the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test.2°
The "checklist" standard, which was articulated in Dorman v.
United States,2 ' has been adopted and modified by a substantial
number of courts.21 ' The Dorman test2 12 focuses on the following
conjunctive list of requirements for exigent circumstances: First, the
crime involved is a grave offense; second, the suspect is reasonably
believed to be armed; third, the police have more than a minimum of
probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime;213 fourth,
strong reasons exist to believe the suspect is on the premises being
entered; fifth, a propensity for escape exists; sixth, entry, though not
consensual, is made peaceably; and seventh, the police take special
precautions for entry at night.
214
This test, despite its acceptance by the courts, is of no practical
use for police forced to decide instantly whether exigent circum-
the suspects gone before a warrant could be obtained would ordinarily justify the police's
quick return to Santana's home and the warrantless entry and arrest." Id at 48.
209. Two commentators have divided the lower court approaches into three categories -
qualitative, definitional, and holistic. Donnino and Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a War-
rantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REv. 90 (1980). For purposes of this article, the definitional
and holistic categories are encompassed in the "totality of the circumstances" test. Excluded
from the exigent circumstances analysis is a discussion of the "emergency doctrine," a similar
and often confused exception to the warrant requirement. The principle emergency doctrine
cases are Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
"We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations ... when they
reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." Id. at 392. One of the
most often cited cases on the emergency doctrine is People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347
N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976), in which the New York court clearly articulated the
distinction between the exigent circumstances and emergency doctrines, noting that the latter
must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest or seize evidence.
210. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc). In Dorman, an armed robber of a clothing
store absconded with a suit. The pants that he left at the scene of the crime contained his
probation papers, which identified the robber by name and address. Four hours later, the
police made a warrantless entry to arrest the suspect. While searching for the suspect, who was
not at home, the police discovered the stolen suit in a closet. The Court allowed the introduc-
tion of the suit into evidence because of the inherent exigency.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978); Salvador v. United States, 505
F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North
Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
212. Some courts have adopted the Dorman test in piecemeal fashion. See, e.g., United
States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974) (entry need not be peaceable); Vance v. North
Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (6th cir. 1974) (no need for probable cause that the suspect will be
found on premises).
213. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
214. 435 F.2d at 393. The court stated that this factor could serve to legitimize warrantless
entry or to strike it down. On the one hand, the lateness .of the hour may make it impractical
to obtain a warrant, which may legitimize warrantless entry. On the other hand, the lateness
of the hour may raise particular concerns over its reasonableness.
stances exist. It is unrealistic to expect a law enforcement officer to
systematically check the Dorman list to ascertain whether all ele-
ments are met.21 5 Moreover, in light of Warden and Santana, the list
contains elements that are now invalid or obsolete. Santana was not
armed and neither Santana nor Warden indicated the need for a
higher quantum of probable cause. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court upheld the entries without explicitly finding that they were
peaceful. If the fourth amendment is to have the effect of safeguard-
ing personal liberty by regulating police practices, an interpretation
of the requisite fourth amendment reasonableness must be expressed
in terms readily applicable to the day-to-day activities of the
police.216
Law enforcement officers may find the "totality of the circum-
stances" test more consistent with their needs. While courts gener-
ally limit exigent circumstances to three standard situations-to
prevent escape, injury, or the destruction of evidence--courts that
rely on the "totality of circumstances" approach apply it on an ad
hoc basis.2 17 Therefore, law enforcement officers are free to rely on
the peculiar facts confronting them at the time of their action to jus-
tify a warrantless non-consensual entry into the home. The case-by-
case method, however, emphasizes the need for "immediate" police
action. Thus, the technique fails to create a certain and appropriate
time frame within which officers are permitted to act without a war-
rant. Furthermore, no explicit conditions afford protection to citi-
zens entitled to rely on the fourth amendment provision for a
warrant to effectuate entry into their houses.
C Resolving the Exigent Circumstances Debate
In the wake of Payton and Steagald, courts will likely be con-
215. The court in State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979), adopted the Dorman
test but identified problems confronting police officers. "It is... appropriate to ask whether
Dorman is too sophisticated to be applied by [police officers], requiring as it does the making
of on-the-spot decisions by a complicated weighing and balancing of a multitude of imprecise
factors. See also Donnino and Girese, supra note 209, at 104, 106.
216. LaFave has proficiently described the police need for a practical, easily applied stan-
dard in their daily routine.
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is pri-
marily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to
be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the
law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisti-
cated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts or requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which
the facile minds of lawyers and judges feed, but they may be literally impossible of
application by the officer in the field.
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures . The Robinson Di-
lemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141. See also LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through
the Exclusionary Rule - Part I: D fing the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REV.
566 (1965).
217. See United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 836 (1978).
fronted with an increasing number of exigent circumstances
claims.2 8 The standard used to measure such claims should meet
two criteria. First, the courts should communicate to law enforce-
ment officials when and under what circumstances they may attempt
a home arrest without an arrest or search warrant. Second, the
courts should adopt a consistent standard for review of the discre-
tionary conduct of law enforcement officials. While the flexibility of
the "totality of the circumstances" test should be preserved, an ob-
jective anchor must ground each exigent circumstances decision. To
accomplish these goals, the exigent circumstances standard must re-
solve the time frame problem in a definitive manner, identify the
acceptable methods of entry into the house without a warrant, and
define with precision what reasons will permit police action without
a warrant. The following proposed standard accomplishes these
objectives.
When a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a
person has committed a crime classified as a felony and has proba-
ble cause to believe that person is in his home or the home of
another person, the officer may effectuate an arrest of that person
without procuring an arrest warrant for that person or a search
warrant for the home if, upon learning of facts sufficient to form a
probable cause belief that the person is in his home or the home of
another, the officer (a) has probable cause to believe that a delay
to procure an appropriate warrant will gravely endanger the of-
ficer or another person, or result in the destruction or removal of
evidence, or the escape of the suspected felon, and (b) enters or
attempts to enter the home where the person is believed to be in a
reasonable manner within the time it would have taken him to
procure an appropriate warrant under the then existing
circumstances.21
The proposed exigent circumstances standard contains the ele-
ments established by Payton and Steagald. Both the arrest warrant
necessary for seizure of a suspect in his own home and the search
warrant necessary for the arrest of a suspect in the home of a third
party can be obviated if the officer has probable cause to believe the
suspect has committed a felony and has the additional probable
cause to believe the suspect is in the particular residence. The sug-
gested standard also establishes two additional conjunctive variables
218. See notes 187-217 and accompanying text supra
219. Donnino and Girese, supra note 209, at 114, have proposed a somewhat similar exi-
gent circumstances test. The differences between their proposal and the one set forth here are
substantial. Rather than utilizing the definitive term "probable cause," Donnino and Girese
rely on the more loosely defined phrase "reasonable belief" in connection with the suspect's
presence in the dwelling and the risk of enumerated dangers justifying warrantless entry.
More importantly, Donnino and Girese provide no mechanism to judge the onset and the
conclusion of the time period within which police officers may act without a warrant. For a
discussion of the importance of these differences, see notes 220, 225, 237-244 and accompany-
ing text infra.
to measure police action and satisfies the three previously mentioned
criteria.
1. Fixed Time Frame.-Measuring time requires establish-
ment of a definitive starting and ending point. The proposed stan-
dard creates a precise starting point for the running of the exigent
circumstances clock. Time is measured from the moment the officer
accumulates facts sufficient to form a probable cause belief that the
person is in his home or the home of another. Courts and police
have an abundance of experience in objectively fixing the point
when probable cause matures. 22 0 Admittedly, the standard forces
the officer to carefully and swiftly evaluate the facts concerning the
presence of the suspect in a particular location. This evaluation,
however, is not nearly so complex or demanding as the process by
which law enforcement officers daily determine the existence or ab-
sence of probable cause to believe a particular person has committed
a crime.
One possible objection to beginning the time period at this stage
is the failure to recognize that officers may have legitimate investiga-
tive reasons to delay the arrest of the suspect.22' Arguably, the of-
ficer who later develops probable cause to believe that someone will
be injured, or that evidence will be destroyed, or that the suspect will
escape, may be prevented from arresting without the appropriate
warrant because the time to procure the appropriate warrant has
elapsed. The standard, however, does not impede the officer who
decides to delay arresting the suspect. Rather, it delineates when the
officer must initiate action to secure the warrant. If, while waiting
for the warrant to be processed, the officer develops probable cause
to believe that arrest is imperative, the officer is permitted to proceed
without the warrant because, a fortiori, it is within the time frame
established by the standard.
Merely fixing the onset of the time frame is insufficient without
also establishing a mechanism for determining when the discretion-
ary period concludes. The proposed standard accomplishes this goal
by allowing the officer to act within the time it would have taken him
to procure an appropriate warrant under the then existing circum-
stances. Thus, the standard sets an outer limit on police discretion
without imposing an arbitrary and capricious fixed time period
within which law officers must act.222 The proposal takes into ac-
220. "The term 'probable cause' rings a bell of certainty. . . . The meaning of 'probable
cause' is deeply imbedded in our constitutional history." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
221. See notes 203-04 and accompanying text supra See also United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310
(1966).
222. Courts have found that exigent circumstances justified police entry when the time
count geographic, personnel, and other variables that confront police
officers of the many different departments within a single jurisdic-
tion. The examination of two hypothetical "exigent circumstances"
situations illustrates how the proposal retains the necessary flex-
ibility, yet simultaneously promotes consistency by fixing the mo-
ment when the alarm rings and signals the end of the discretionary
period.
Assume that early one weekend evening two "convenience mar-
kets" are robbed by different pistol wielding gunmen. One of the
markets is located in a large city at one end of the state; the other
business is adjacent to a highway running through a small, rural
town at the opposite end of the jurisdiction. The solitary gunmen
who committed the crimes are opposed by law enforcement officers
with very different resources. In the first instance, the investigating
officers are members of a department with thousands of officers,
hundreds of police vehicles, a sophisticated communications net-
work, and an around-the-clock arraignment procedure staffed by ju-
dicial officers, prosecutors, and defense counsel. In the other case,
the police department consists of a handful of officers, few patrol
cars, a simple two-way radio system, and a magistrate who is avail-
able during weekday business hours and "on call" for emergencies.
Suppose that in both hypothetical situations excellent police
work results in identifying the armed robber by one o'clock the next
morning. A member of each department has developed sufficient
facts to conclude that probable cause exists to believe each robber
had secreted himself in the home of a presumably innocent third
party. Under the proposed standard, the exigent circumstances clock
would start at one o'clock for each of the police officers. The stan-
dard, however, would allow for different discretionary periods to ac-
count for the existing circumstances posed by the two situations.
Assume that in the large city investigation the officer could ra-
dio for back-up support and have a number of police officers assist-
ing him within minutes. Another call by the officer to the
communications center could be relayed to the on-duty prosecuting
and judicial officials. Assume also that the officer's probable cause
could be evaluated by the magistrate, the oath administered, and ar-
span between the crime and warrantless entry was a matter of minutes, Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), or when the time span between the crime and warrantless entry to arrest
was longer, United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974) Oust over one hour); Rodriguez
v. Butler, 536 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976) (three hours); Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) (four hours); United States v. Flick-
inger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 836 (1978) (five hours); United States v.
Campbell, 581 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1978) (nearly eight hours). See Note, Warrantless Entry to
Arrest, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655, 678-79, for a proposal that exigent circumstances should expire
after eight hours.
rest and search warrants issued within a short period.2 2 3 Under these
"existing circumstances," the ime allowed for acting without a war-
rant should not exceed one-half hour.
The rural officer established probable cause at the same time as
his large city colleague, but distinctly different "existing circum-
stances" confront him. His call for back-up assistance cannot be sat-
isfied until significantly greater time expires because fewer personnel
are available and significantly greater geographic distances exist.
Moreover, the magistrate who is "on-call" is located miles away and
the time required to drive to the magistrate's home, present the prob-
able cause information, have the appropriate warrants issued, and
return to the third party's home to execute the legal documents ex-
ceeds one hour. Under these circumstances, the time allowed for
acting without a warrant approaches two hours.
In both cases, the proposed standard precisely establishes the
duration of the exigent circumstances period, which is "the time...
taken. . . to procure an appropriate warrant." The standard, how-
ever, is flexible enough to account for the distinctly different circum-
stances in each case. Thus, although the two crimes are identical and
the officers establish probable cause at the same moment, one sus-
pect may be arrested without a warrant in the home of a third party
one and one-half hours after the other suspect. The former defend-
ant, however, should not be permitted to complain of differential
treatment. The suspect's constitutional rights are not infringed if the
arresting officer acts within the time he could have actually obtained
a warrant under the existing circumstances.
The standard is consistent with the principles established by the
Supreme Court and the lower courts and creates an easily defined
"exigent circumstances" time period. Police officers who are aware
of the resources available in their particular jurisdiction can predict
with some certainty the time available to act without a warrant. Re-
viewing courts can easily evaluate whether officers could have ob-
tained a warrant prior to acting without one.224
2. Method of Entry.-The fifth and sixth items in the Dorman
checklist 225 pose special problems that must be resolved by a coher-
ent exigent circumstances standard. Dorman requires peaceful entry
and special precautions when entry occurs at night. Because entry
into a home pursuant to exigent circumstances is an exception to the
223. See note 123 supra
224. Although each law enforcement agency has different personnel, communications,
and geographic factors with which to contend, those factors are easily susceptible of proof.
Moreover, it is suggested that as courts become familiar with the proposed standard, the differ-
ent types of police departments will fall into recognizable categories.
225. See text accompanying notes 209-214 supra
preferred warrant-authorized entry, the Dorman court created more
stringent restrictions on police action. It is questionable, however,
whether these restrictions are necessary under the proposed exigent
circumstances standard. A reexamination of one of the hypothetical
situations highlights the issue.
Assume that the suspect flees226 to the home of an innocent
third party. After the officer develops probable cause to believe the
suspect is within the third party's home but before expiration of the
time for obtaining a warrant, the officer obtains information suffi-
cient to believe that the innocent third party is being held hostage, or
that the suspect has the ability to escape, or that the proceeds from
the robbery will be destroyed. 227 A forcible entry is possible and a
peaceful entry is likely to result in personal injury, escape of the sus-
pect, or destruction of evidence. Adherence to the Dorman peaceful
exigent circumstances standard frustrates the primary purpose of the
exception to the warrant requirement. The proposed standard, how-
ever, permits non-peaceful entry if it is accomplished "in a reason-
able manner" under the circumstances. The proposal equates an
exigent circumstances entry with an entry authorized by a warrant.
Federal law and most state laws demand that an officer execut-
ing a warrant announce his authority and purpose before effecting a
forcible home entry.228 The "announcement of authority and pur-
pose" requirement is not inherent in the fourth amendment. The
Constitution provides for "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their . .. houses .. . against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... ,229 An officer armed with an appropriate warrant and
confronted by circumstances in which the announcement of author-
ity and purpose hinders the accomplishment of legitimate law en-
forcement goals may enter the home without announcement or
consent and by force.230 The applicable standard is the reasonable-
ness of the entry measured by the existing circumstances. Different
standards should not apply to a police officer confronted by exigent
circumstances who acts without a warrant, but within the time a war-
rant could be obtained.
The nighttime entry issue has an additional dimension. Stea-
gald resolved that entry into a third party's home to arrest is judged
by the standards applied to a search, not the standards applied to an
226. This should be distinguished from the "hot pursuit" cases, in which law enforcement
officers are on the heels of the fleeing suspect who has recently committed a crime. See, e.g.,
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).
227. For a discussion of the three reasons for the exigent circumstances exception estab-
lished in the proposed standard, see notes 232-34 and accompanying text infra
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976). See State v. Gassner, 6 Ore. App. 452, 488 P.2d 822
(1971), for a discussion of the various state views on announcement of authority and purpose.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
230. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
arrest. Equating the proposed exigent circumstances standard with
warranted home searches requires accounting for prevailing distinc-
tions between daytime and nighttime home searches.
Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a search "warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issu-
ing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for rea-
sonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than
daytime."' 231 Although a higher standard applies for nighttime
searches, the standard can be met by presenting evidence of "reason-
able cause" to justify a nighttime search warrant. Similar standards
should apply to the warrantless entry into a third party home under
exigent circumstances to arrest a suspect.2 32 If the officer acts within
the time frame of the proposed standard and for reasonable cause,
the third party is protected by the same criteria as in the search war-
rant situation.
The proposed standard assumes that entries authorized by an
appropriate warrant and entries effectuated within the time required
to get a warrant under exigent circumstances cannot and should not
be differentiated. The value of this approach is obvious if one con-
siders the method of entry. If law enforcement officials must meet
the same standard for warranted and warrantless entries, police of-
ficers will not misunderstand the correct criteria to apply in a partic-
ular situation, judicial review of police conduct will not entail ad hoc
decisionmaking, and most importantly, individuals will enjoy identi-
cal constitutional protections when the officer has a warrant and
when exigent circumstances exist. Thus, the need for effective law
enforcement can be balanced against personal liberty and privacy in
a coherent and consistent manner.
3. Reasons Justifying Entry Without a Warrant.-The proposal
limits justifications for warrantless entry to those either specifically
approved by the Supreme Court or strongly suggested by Court
dicta.
Grave danger to an officer or another person obviously compels
police action.233 Society will not and cannot countenance law en-
forcement officials' inaction in the presence of a risk of serious physi-
231. Twenty-three states have a statutory requirement limiting execution of search war-
rants to daytime hours, absent unusual circumstances. Fourteen states explicitly allow
searches at any hour and the remaining jurisdictions have no statutory provision on the sub-
ject. See A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (P.O. Draft) 512-13 (1975).
See also Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
232. FED. R. CRiM. P. 4 1(c). No federal or state law prevents execution of an arrest war-
rant during nighttime hours. Therefore, entry into the suspect's own home to arrest would not
be hindered by the nighttime search restriction applicable to third party home situations.
233. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 198 (1967), the Court specifically noted that
"grave ... danger. . .[to] the lives of others" was an exigent circumstance compelling imme-
diate action by law enforcers.
cal injury to the person. Similarly, justifications premised on
preventing a felon's escape receive strong judicial endorsement.234
Courts balance the danger to society posed by the continued freedom
of the criminal with the lessening of individual privacy and consis-
tently find that exceptional circumstances permit invasion of the
home to prevent escape.
The most troublesome exception concerns the destruction or re-
moval of evidence. Loss of evidence as justification235 for the inva-
sion of a person's home has troubled courts.236 While the first two
exceptions are based on immediate and substantial danger to others
posed by possible physical harm or by the fleeing felon, comparable
danger is absent in the destruction of evidence situation. To be sure,
evidence necessary to convict the suspected felon could be lost. It is
difficult, however, to equate the imminent risk of physical injury
with the possible future loss of a criminal conviction. Most courts
permit police officers to act without a warrant if evidence is
threatened.237 Consistent Supreme Court dicta suggest that the de-
struction or removal of evidence provide exigent circumstances.23
The proposed standard incorporates this exception because the strict
evidentiary standards of the proposal afford adequate protection for
the individual.
The proposed standard utilizes a multiple level probable cause
approach. First, the officer must have probable cause to believe that
the suspect has committed the crime. Additionally, the officer must
have probable cause to believe that the suspect is located in a partic-
ular residence. Although police officials will encounter difficulty in
meeting this test,2 39 a lesser standard would dilute fourth amend-
ment protections and oppose the principles announced in Payton
and Steagald.
The third and final requirement of probable cause is met by an
assessment of the need to act without a warrant. At this stage the
officer must apply the probable cause standard to two variables.
234. Although the escape exception has been discussed by the Court in the context of hot
pursuit, see, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948), United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1978), lower courts have applied the exception outside of chase
situations. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc)
(the "likelihood ... that the suspect will escape, if not swiftly apprehended" may justify a
warrantless entry to arrest).
235. On the destruction or removal of evidence, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,
47-48 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973) (five point test to meas-
ure the exigent circumstances of threatened destruction or removal of evidence).
237. Id See also Donnino & Girese, supra note 209, at 96.
238. See note 235 supra.
239. See notes 180-86 and accompanying text supra.
First, the officer must have probable cause to believe that injury, es-
cape, or the destruction or removal of evidence will occur. Second,
the officer must be able to articulate facts sufficient to establish prob-
able cause to believe that the injury, escape, or destruction or re-
moval of evidence will occur within the time necessary to obtain an
appropriate warrant.
A three-tiered probable cause requirement provides significant
protection of individual rights. Furthermore, the proposed standard
utilities criteria known to and easily applied by police officers and
judges. The standard strikes an appropriate balance between per-
sonal rights and societal needs.Without a balanced standard, the exi-
gent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement will either
erode the vitality of Payton and Steagald or severely restrict law en-
forcement officials in the reasonable performance of their duties.
VII. Standing to Challenge A Search and Seizure: Limitations
on Payton and Steagald
An arrestee clearly has a valid privacy interest in his own home,
but an arrestee's interest while on third party premises is uncertain.
Recently, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of interests pro-
tected by the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures. A legitimate presence on the premises does not control the
existence of a reasonable privacy expectation.
In United States v. Salvucci24" and Rawlings v. Kentucky,24" ' the
Court displayed its willingness to limit the number of defendants
who can challenge fourth amendment violations through motions to
suppress evidence. Additionally, these decisions solidified an unmis-
takable trend toward reconstruction of the exclusionary rule by rede-
fining standing in fourth amendment cases.
A. The Evolution of Standing
Jones v. United States242 addressed the potential conflict be-
tween a defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights in particular
search and seizure cases. The court expanded the common law re-
quirements of a possessory of proprietary interest in the seized prop-
erty or the searched premises. "[A]nyone legitimately on the
premises had standing to challenge a search or seizure" '243 and a de-
fendant had to be given automatic standing to challenge a search or
seizure when charged with a possessory crime.244 The holding was
240. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
241. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
242. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
243. Id at 267.
244. Id at 264-65.
based on the view that if the defendant established standing by
showing a possessory interest in the articles seized, he effectively ad-
mitted the essential elements of the criminal offense. To challenge
the defendant's standing, the prosecution could deny at a suppres-
sion hearing that the defendant had a possessory interest in property,
but could assert the contradictory position at trial without
prejudice.245
The Court's consideration of privacy interests in fourth amend-
ment analysis helped to mark the demise of Jones. The two cases of
Katz v. United States2" and Mancusi v. DeFore,247 however, tempo-
rarily expanded standing in fourth amendment cases. In Katz, the
Court held that the fourth amendment not only protects persons
from unauthorized intrusions against their persons and property, but
also extends a reasonable expectation of privacy to citizens. 248 This
principle was applied to the standing questioned raised in Man-
cusi.249 The Court concluded that the right to invoke fourth amend-
ment protection was based upon the reasonable expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion into the area searched. Thus,
standing was not dependent upon a property right in the invaded
area.
In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court held that the "legitimately on the
premises" test of Jones was "too broad a gauge for measurement of
Fourth Amendment rights."25 The Court also announced two de-
partures from the Katz rationale. First, the "legitimate expectation
of privacy" language was equated with a privacy notion based solely
on societal perceptions.25' Second, the Court reintroduced property
concepts into the determination of a "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy."' 252 The Court reiterated that the fourth amendment protects
people, not places, but stated that possessory or proprietary interests
often define the expectation of privacy. Although the Court relied
heavily on the lack of possession, it also emphasized that arcane
property concepts did not control.253 Thus, the Court paved a path
for contradictory interpretations of the decision.
245. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), limited the automatic standing rule of
Jones. In Simmons, the Court held that pretrial testimony to establish standing could be used
against the defendant in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The defendant's testimony, however,
could only be used for impeachment, not for the substantive question of guilt or innocence.
See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 608 (1980).
246. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
247. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
248. 389 U.S. at 351.
249. 392 U.S. at 367.
250. 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
251. Id
252. Id at 148.
253. "We adhere to the view expressed in Jones ... that arcane distinctions developed in
property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like ought not to control." Id
at 143.
United States v. Salucci25 a revealed the extent to which the
Court was willing to manipulate property law concepts to overturn
the automatic standing rule of Jones. The Salvucci Court extrapo-
lated the Rakas test for determining whether defendants could chal-
lenge an illegal search and seizure in a possessory crime. Possession
was no longer determinative of fourth amendment rights; the crucial
variable was an expectation of privacy in the searched premises or
seized property.255 A prosecutor could consistently allege possession
to prove the substantive offense and assert lack of privacy interests to
challenge fourth amendment protection.256
In the companion case of Rawlings v. Kentucky, 257 the Court
held that possession of articles seized by the police was insufficient to
establish a right to challenge a search and seizure performed as an
adjunct to an initial search that uncovered the property. The Court
relied on Rakas and Salvucci to conclude that no right to challenge
the search existed, since arcane concepts of property law no longer
controlled the ability to claim fourth amendment protection.258 In
dissent, Justice Marshall identified an inherent paradox.
[T]he Court rather inconsistently denies that property rights may,
by themselves, entitle one to the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but simultaneously suggests that a person may claim such
protection only if his expectation of privacy in the premises
searched is so strong that he may exclude all others from that
place. 259
B. Standing Prerequisites After Steagald
In Steagald, the Court noted that fourth amendment rights were
personal and that vicarious protection could not be extended to those
who did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
searched area.26  The Steagald decision, however, addressed
whether residents of the home could challenge a search, not whether
the subject of an arrest warrant could object to the absence of a
search warrant when he was apprehended in another's home. In that
case, the Government attempted to connect petitioner Steagald with
the house and acquiesced in statements indicating that the residence
254. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
255. Id at 93.
256. "While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining
whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated... property rights are
neither the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry." Id at 91.
257. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
258. Id at 105 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149). Drugs were found during an
entry to arrest an occupant of a private dwelling pursuant to an arrest warrant. Although the
target of the warrant was not present, other occupants were searched. The defendant admitted
placing drugs in a companion's purse prior to police entry. The government conceded that the
search of the persons found within was unconstitutional.
259. 448 U.S. at 119.
260. 101 S. Ct. at 1651.
belonged to Steagald.261 '
Persons present within a residence when police enter armed
only with an arrest warrant for the suspect may possess different
standing requisites. An owner present in his own home surely has
the right to challenge a search. Regular occupants such as tenants or
family members who have access to the entire house also possess
standing. Steagald illustrates this principle. A non-resident suspect
present in the home of another person does not have the right to
challenge the absence of a search warrant. One commentator has
argued that even if the accused demonstrates a privacy interest in the
premises of a third party, fourth amendment protection does not ex-
ceed the privacy interest that attaches in his own home.262 Payton
mandates that an arrest warrant, not a search warrant, be obtained
in this instance. 263 Finally, a mere "bystander" on the premises
2 6
cannot challenge a warrantless search, unless the bystander meets
the tests of fRakas and Salvucci.2 65 Absence of a search warrant,
therefore, can only be challenged if the owner of the premises raises
a fourth amendment claim. Finally, Rawlings clarifies that no right
to challenge government conduct exists unless the person in posses-
sion of seized personal property has an independent right to chal-
lenge the search. The emphasis placed on the area searched
significantly limits standing to claim fourth amendment protection.
Thus, Court decisions have lessened the incentive for police officers
to procure a search warrant in many situations.
C Standing Limitations on the Impact of Payton and Steagald
By establishing the Rakas-Salvucci test, the Court appears to
patently disregard the principle announced in Katz that "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home. . . is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . [bIut what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected. 2 66 In Rakas, the utilization of societal
perceptions to determine the reasonable expectation of privacy de-
tracts from the spirit of protection afforded by Katz. Furthermore,
the absence of reference to Katz in the Salvucci opinion suggests that
a person's right to be protected from unauthorized intrusions is
limited.267
Great emphasis is now placed on narrow property and posses-
261. Id at 1646.
262. Mansolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrant. The Seizure ofa Suspect in the Home
ofa Third Party, 54 CONN. B.J. 299 (1980).
263. 445 U.S. at 603.
264. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
265. See notes 249-255 and accompanying text supra
266. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
267. Similarly, in Rawlings, the Court did not discuss in detail the nature of the relation-
ship between the defendant and bailee, nor did the Court indicate whether a relationship of
236
sory interests in the area searched and little, if any, importance at-
taches to interests in the property seized. Thus, a defendant moving
to suppress the fruits of an illegal search in his home or the home of
another is now burdened with a distinct handicap. The demise of
automatic standing and the Court's present interpretation of the is-
sue will severely restrict the impact of Payton and Steagald.
268  If
individuals are precluded from objecting to warrantless entries and
searches of homes by their lack of standing, little incentive remains
for law enforcement officers to comply with the warrant rules an-
nounced in Payton and Steagald.
VIII. Conclusion
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Payton and Steagald are
truly landmark pronouncements. Although these decisions resolve
lower court debate on the necessity for particular warrants to enter a
home to arrest a suspect, several issues remain unresolved. The pre-
cise meaning of "home ' 269 is yet to be determined in light of the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard of Katz v. United
States.270 Furthermore, the "extra increment of probable cause"
language of Payton271 must be given an evidentiary weight that can
be understood by police officers and reviewing courts. Lower courts
will wrestle with these questions until an acceptable consensus
emerges or until the Supreme Court issues definitive rulings. Thus,
the practical impact of Payton on arrests without warrants in public
places is undetermined. Police officers may routinely obtain arrest
warrants, hoping that suspects will be found in a home rather than
on the street or in a public building.
Although Payton and Steagald appear to insure expanded con-
more than a few days would have affected the outcome. In reality, a number of instances may
exist in which possession of property is linked to a privacy expectation.
268. Prior to the advent of "automatic standing" in Jones, the requirement of standing
significantly limited the number of persons who could invoke the exclusionary rule. A com-
mentary of the pre-automatic standing era suggested the motivation of courts restrictively
utilizing standing.
"Mhe requirement of standing to suppress unreasonably seized evidence is a mani-
festation of the courts' opposition to the federal exclusionary rule. With surprising
uniformity and severity the federal courts have invoked the requirement of standing
to suppress unreasonably seized evidence in such a way as to sharply limit the bene-
fits of the exclusionary rule. They have in effect adopted much of the Wigmorean
antipathy for the federal rule by the imposition of severe limitations upon the defini-
tion of those entitled to invoke the rule.
Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 N.W.U. L. REV. 471, 472
(1952).
One can only guess the underlying motivation of those now supporting a return to a more
restrictive standing rule. It is not necessary to speculate, however, on the practical implications
of such an approach: Fewer defendants will have standing to challenge law enforcement con-
duct and fewer defendants will benefit from the rights accorded in Payton and Steagald
269. See notes 162-79 and accompanying text supra
270. See note 248 and accompanying text supra
271. See notes 180-86 and accompanying text supra.
stitutional rights for criminal suspects, two lingering issues cast
doubt over the effective enforcement of those rights. First, unless it
is defined and constrained, the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement may significantly infringe upon the rights
extended by Payton and Steagald. The second and more dangerous
possibility is the continued erosion or elimination of automatic
standing to contest illegal searches and seizures by law enforcement
officers. If the courts fail to grant homeowners, suspects, and by-
standers the rights to challenge warrantless home entries, the protec-
tive cloak of Payton and Steagald will become a sham.
